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Juan Cole: The president's Shiite allies in Iraq really don't like some of James Baker's Sunni-friendly suggestions

... President Bush is presumably in sympathy with one of the ISG's main concerns about partition, which is that there should be a central Iraqi government in control of the country's petroleum reserves and revenues. Both James Baker and the president have ties to U.S. petroleum companies, which would rather negotiate with a single central government than be forced to strike deals with each province or regional federation.

To forestall partition, and to promote national unity and reconciliation, the ISG recommends that the United States and the Iraqi government "support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League." The Arab League is mostly made up of Sunni Arab states, and it has had a rocky relationship with the new Iraqi government, dominated by Shiites and Kurds. The Sunnis are supported by a majority of Iraq's neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Baker also has long ties to the Saudis and other Sunni Arab powers. Only Iran supports Iraq's Shiites.

Whether Bush will adopt the idea of a conference involving Iraq's neighbors is not clear. But it is clear that his Shiite allies will resist it, and that here is where he may be forced to choose between his new Iranian-influenced Iraqi friends and his old Saudi friends and James Baker.

On Monday, Bush met with Shiite cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who heads up SCIRI as well as being the nominal leader of the United Iraqi Alliance, which has 128 seats in Iraq's 275-member parliament. Despite al-Hakim's close ties to Iran, he has been a consistent ally of the U.S. in Iraq. Bush works Iraqi politicians the same way he worked the Texas Legislature or Congress, and it may be difficult for him to buck his Shiite and Kurdish allies on this issue. By Monday, the ISG proposal for a regional conference to stop Iraq's sectarian violence had already leaked, and al-Hakim gave Bush an earful about it.

After the meeting, al-Hakim came out strongly against the ISG proposal. "We believe that the Iraqi issues should be solved by the Iraqis, with the help of friends everywhere. But we reject any attempts to have a regional or international role in solving the Iraqi issue."

On at least one subject, however, Bush will not have to choose between the Shiites and the ISG. Both groups already disagree with him.

In Amman, Bush said he wanted to start withdrawing American troops from Iraq "as soon as possible." He cautioned, however, that it might take time. He reassured al-Maliki that he was committed to keeping American troops in Iraq "until the job is complete." Al-Maliki seemed not to want the reassurance.

Maliki wants American troops out, and so does the ISG. The ISG wants most active combat troops out of Iraq by early 2008. Maliki wants them out faster.

Both timetables would be unrealistic even if the president weren't clinging to the idea of victory. But Bush is unable to let go of the neoconservative folly that a democratic Iraq will transform the Middle East and form a new pillar of U.S. policy in the region. As he said in Amman, "It's in our interests to help liberty prevail in the Middle East, starting with Iraq. And that's why this business about 'graceful exit' simply has no realism to it at all." On this issue, Bush has fewer friends of any description every day.
Read entire article at Salon