John C. Kornblum: Reagan’s Brandenburg Concerto ("Tear down this wall ...")
[John C. Kornblum is chairman of Lazard Germany. He served as an American diplomat for more than 35 years, concluding his career in 2001 as U.S. Ambassador in Berlin.]
Twenty years ago this June, President Ronald Reagan mounted a podium in front of the ugly concrete barrier separating the Brandenburg Gate from West Berlin and delivered a speech that included a simple plea: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”
It seems hard to believe now that, barely two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, such a self-evident request raised anxiety among Western Europe’s cognoscenti. But it’s true: A mood had been developing in Europe that caused many to react with unease to the President’s words. Fifteen years of Ostpolitik and six years of bitter argument over NATO’s plans to counter the new Soviet SS-20 missile with deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) of its own had bred in many Europeans an acute aversion to any confrontation with the East. Growing American concern about the consequences of such drift was the primary reason that the speech, initially intended as a ceremonial address on the occasion of Berlin’s 750th anniversary, became instead a major political statement.
In the West European public mind, during the spring of 1987, NATO’s effort to defend itself against a new Soviet weapon had become yet another chapter in the Reagan Administration’s confrontational, militarized stance against the Soviet Union. The agendas of most European leaders were increasingly being defined by worries about the possibility of an imminent nuclear war. Skillful Soviet psychological “coaching” had created a widespread impression that peace could be secured only on the foundation of a perpetually divided Europe. In fact, hopes in Germany and in much of Europe on that June day lay not with Ronald Reagan, but with Mikhail Gorbachev.
It would be satisfying to claim that Ronald Reagan’s stirring challenge dramatically reversed this mood. The truth, however, is that Reagan’s June 12, 1987 speech had little immediate effect. In the days and weeks following the event, neither the American nor the European press treated the speech as an especially noteworthy event. Neither, of course, did the Soviets.
It was only after November 1989, when the Soviet Empire began to crumble, that the world began to honor President Reagan’s challenge as a harbinger of change. President George H.W. Bush’s immediate support for Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s dramatic push for reunification transformed perceptions of the American role in Germany. Almost overnight, the 1987 speech was resurrected as proof of the American spirit that had made reunification possible. Until then, West Europeans had relegated it to the archives as another example of the poetic license the former movie star allowed himself on such ceremonial occasions.
Today, of course, President Reagan’s Berlin challenge has become an object of admiration and legend. As with all legends, its origins and purposes have been subject to many interpretations. Some have defined the speech as a singular demonstration of American idealism, transcending the less lofty aims of then-contemporary American foreign policy. Learned professors have sought to find still deeper truths in a text essentially written by a fractious committee. In any event, all such interpretations of Reagan’s Berlin speech miss a critical point: The President’s appearance before the Brandenburg Gate was not an isolated event. The speech was part of a calculated strategy, conceived over several years by Administration officials, to counter the damage to Transatlantic unity caused by the massive public opposition to NATO INF developments, and to arrest the steady drift in Germany toward accommodation with the Russians. How do I know? I was the person charged with much of the planning and substance of the event....
Read entire article at http://www.the-american-interest.com
Twenty years ago this June, President Ronald Reagan mounted a podium in front of the ugly concrete barrier separating the Brandenburg Gate from West Berlin and delivered a speech that included a simple plea: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”
It seems hard to believe now that, barely two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, such a self-evident request raised anxiety among Western Europe’s cognoscenti. But it’s true: A mood had been developing in Europe that caused many to react with unease to the President’s words. Fifteen years of Ostpolitik and six years of bitter argument over NATO’s plans to counter the new Soviet SS-20 missile with deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) of its own had bred in many Europeans an acute aversion to any confrontation with the East. Growing American concern about the consequences of such drift was the primary reason that the speech, initially intended as a ceremonial address on the occasion of Berlin’s 750th anniversary, became instead a major political statement.
In the West European public mind, during the spring of 1987, NATO’s effort to defend itself against a new Soviet weapon had become yet another chapter in the Reagan Administration’s confrontational, militarized stance against the Soviet Union. The agendas of most European leaders were increasingly being defined by worries about the possibility of an imminent nuclear war. Skillful Soviet psychological “coaching” had created a widespread impression that peace could be secured only on the foundation of a perpetually divided Europe. In fact, hopes in Germany and in much of Europe on that June day lay not with Ronald Reagan, but with Mikhail Gorbachev.
It would be satisfying to claim that Ronald Reagan’s stirring challenge dramatically reversed this mood. The truth, however, is that Reagan’s June 12, 1987 speech had little immediate effect. In the days and weeks following the event, neither the American nor the European press treated the speech as an especially noteworthy event. Neither, of course, did the Soviets.
It was only after November 1989, when the Soviet Empire began to crumble, that the world began to honor President Reagan’s challenge as a harbinger of change. President George H.W. Bush’s immediate support for Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s dramatic push for reunification transformed perceptions of the American role in Germany. Almost overnight, the 1987 speech was resurrected as proof of the American spirit that had made reunification possible. Until then, West Europeans had relegated it to the archives as another example of the poetic license the former movie star allowed himself on such ceremonial occasions.
Today, of course, President Reagan’s Berlin challenge has become an object of admiration and legend. As with all legends, its origins and purposes have been subject to many interpretations. Some have defined the speech as a singular demonstration of American idealism, transcending the less lofty aims of then-contemporary American foreign policy. Learned professors have sought to find still deeper truths in a text essentially written by a fractious committee. In any event, all such interpretations of Reagan’s Berlin speech miss a critical point: The President’s appearance before the Brandenburg Gate was not an isolated event. The speech was part of a calculated strategy, conceived over several years by Administration officials, to counter the damage to Transatlantic unity caused by the massive public opposition to NATO INF developments, and to arrest the steady drift in Germany toward accommodation with the Russians. How do I know? I was the person charged with much of the planning and substance of the event....