Gideon Rachman: The wrong lessons from Munich
[Mr. Rachman is a journalist.]
... There are few more damaging taunts than to be compared to the British prime minister who tried and failed to appease Hitler at the Munich summit of 1938. In the US, in particular, the ghost of Chamberlain is regularly brought out to frighten those who are deemed insufficiently resolute in confronting the enemy of the moment. In the run-up to the Iraq war, the lessons of Munich were invoked by President George W. Bush and any number of neo-conservative commentators
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Republican, was at it again during this month's congressional hearings on Iraq. She reminded her audience that: "Neville Chamberlain genuinely believed that he had brought 'peace in our time' by washing his hands of what he believed to be an isolated dispute in 'a far away country between people of whom we know nothing'. That country was Czechoslovakia and Chamberlain's well-intentioned efforts . . . only ensured that an immensely larger threat was thereby unleashed." The lesson was clear. Confront evil regimes as soon as possible.
Chamberlain is generally accused of two grave sins. First, he acted dishonourably by sacrificing a defenceless nation to a ruthless dictator. Second, by appeasing Hitler he merely made him more aggressive and made a larger and bloodier war inevitable.
But both these bits of conventional wisdom are distinctly questionable. And the argument is of more than historical interest. Misapplied "lessons of Munich" have led to repeated foreign policy disasters since 1945.
Take the charge of "dishonour" first. Chamberlain's goal was to avoid a world war. This was an entirely honourable, indeed laudable, aim. Britain, unlike France, had no treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. It was not morally obliged to fight - and was in no position to save Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain accepted an evil outcome in the hope of avoiding a greater evil.
In the end, his hopes of avoiding a world war proved futile. For most people this remains the real lesson of Munich: appeasement is pointless; it merely emboldens the aggressor. But again, this is a misreading of what happened in 1938. As Ian Kershaw, author of the standard biography, puts it: "Hitler felt cheated" by the Munich agreement - he wanted a war.
By contrast, delaying the conflict until 1939 proved crucially important for Britain. In the intervening year, Britain was able to build up its air force to a point where it was able to fight and win the Battle of Britain. If war had broken out in 1938, Britain might well have lost. Chamberlain also knew that the public longed for peace - if he had opted to fight in 1938, he would have led a deeply divided nation. The spectacle of Hitler violating the Munich agreement and then turning on Poland meant that, by 1939, Britain was united....
Read entire article at Financial Times
... There are few more damaging taunts than to be compared to the British prime minister who tried and failed to appease Hitler at the Munich summit of 1938. In the US, in particular, the ghost of Chamberlain is regularly brought out to frighten those who are deemed insufficiently resolute in confronting the enemy of the moment. In the run-up to the Iraq war, the lessons of Munich were invoked by President George W. Bush and any number of neo-conservative commentators
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Republican, was at it again during this month's congressional hearings on Iraq. She reminded her audience that: "Neville Chamberlain genuinely believed that he had brought 'peace in our time' by washing his hands of what he believed to be an isolated dispute in 'a far away country between people of whom we know nothing'. That country was Czechoslovakia and Chamberlain's well-intentioned efforts . . . only ensured that an immensely larger threat was thereby unleashed." The lesson was clear. Confront evil regimes as soon as possible.
Chamberlain is generally accused of two grave sins. First, he acted dishonourably by sacrificing a defenceless nation to a ruthless dictator. Second, by appeasing Hitler he merely made him more aggressive and made a larger and bloodier war inevitable.
But both these bits of conventional wisdom are distinctly questionable. And the argument is of more than historical interest. Misapplied "lessons of Munich" have led to repeated foreign policy disasters since 1945.
Take the charge of "dishonour" first. Chamberlain's goal was to avoid a world war. This was an entirely honourable, indeed laudable, aim. Britain, unlike France, had no treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. It was not morally obliged to fight - and was in no position to save Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain accepted an evil outcome in the hope of avoiding a greater evil.
In the end, his hopes of avoiding a world war proved futile. For most people this remains the real lesson of Munich: appeasement is pointless; it merely emboldens the aggressor. But again, this is a misreading of what happened in 1938. As Ian Kershaw, author of the standard biography, puts it: "Hitler felt cheated" by the Munich agreement - he wanted a war.
By contrast, delaying the conflict until 1939 proved crucially important for Britain. In the intervening year, Britain was able to build up its air force to a point where it was able to fight and win the Battle of Britain. If war had broken out in 1938, Britain might well have lost. Chamberlain also knew that the public longed for peace - if he had opted to fight in 1938, he would have led a deeply divided nation. The spectacle of Hitler violating the Munich agreement and then turning on Poland meant that, by 1939, Britain was united....