Charles W. Hayford: Don't toy with China
[Mr. Hayford is Visiting Scholar, Department of History, Northwestern University.]
The toy company Mattel has apologized for blaming China for the recall of millions of toys. It turns out that most of the recalls were caused by design flaws. Can we add this sorry affair to the list of flaps, scares, and panics that have marked relations between our two countries since 1949?
The "who lost China?" flap and Chinese anti-American scare campaigns of the 1950s kicked off a generation-long mutual panic which made genuine differences between the two countries hard to negotiate. Then U.S. President Richard Nixon visited in 1972, in part, to play the "China card" against Moscow. This was a realist course of action, as was Washington's response (or rather non-response) to the suppression of the Democracy Movement of 1989.
American presidential candidates have a habit of using China as a stick to cudgel the opposition. Of course, once elected, the candidate soon discovers why basic China policy hasn't changed since Nixon: outsiders can do little to change China if they don't engage the leaders of China. We strive to hit the right balance between winking at its transgressions and pushing for changes.
The 1990s and early 2000s saw a series of flaps. Chinese campaign contributions, the arrest of alleged spy Wen Ho-lee, bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and downing of an American spy plane were among them. The post-9/11 war on terror only papered over conflicts.
Each of these scares had a basis; the two countries have different interests. Still, strung together, these flaps bring to mind the old Chinese observation that once you have been bitten by a snake, you will panic when you see a piece of rope.
In China, there is no less touchiness. The Olympics next summer are an honor which Chinese felt was unjustly delayed. While we should all pray "No Flaps, please," problems will certainly arise, ranging from killer air and water pollution to demonstrations from Falun Gong and Tibetan sympathizers. There will be provocations, incidents, and crackdowns. If we are not careful, we will find ourselves back in crisis mode.
Chinese popular pride, euphoria, and indignation are not manufactured. The regime can at best channel or deflect them, though also exploiting them as a means of replacing faded revolutionary fervor. But recent studies using newly available classified documents confirm that in the diplomatic dance leading up to Henry Kissinger's "Operation Marco Polo" in 1971, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai knew that Americans needed the "China card" to triangulate against the Soviets and to influence the North Vietnamese. China equally needed American support against Soviet nuclear threats, yet American demonstrations of respect were crucial. Without them, China would not have negotiated.
On the U.S. side, the toxic toy menace tapped a nerve in something the way that a doctor produces that famous knee jerk -- one small tap in the right place. True, toxic toothpaste, pet food, or toys are alarming. But they are more frightening for Chinese consumers, tens of thousands of whom suffer each year from defective or fraudulent drugs, contaminated foods, or weak safety standards.
The fundamental problem is not just the totalitarian control of the country by the Chinese Communist Party. The impressive rate of economic growth for more than a quarter of a century is highly worthy of respect, even though this success produced pollution, corruption, piracy of intellectual property, destruction of water sources and any number of dire problems.
The bigger challenge for the government, paradoxically, is to break out of a cycle of ineffectiveness, especially outside the major cities. The state lacks the legitimacy to elicit compliance without force, but the use of force further drains legitimacy. The central government passes laws, spews out regulations, strikes moralistic stances, and makes promises. Dramatic actions are taken and corrupt officials are arrested -- even executed -- but when one problem is addressed, others get worse. Local officials who are worried about jobs and revenues are not eager to listen to Beijing's orders to kill the goose that lays the golden egg, never mind that the goose leaves droppings all over the place.
The toy flap showed ways to achieve some good. The American media now do far better than before in presenting China's problems in perspective. We get better results when the question is not "what crimes have you committed against us?" but "what can benefit us both?" On the issue of toy safety, Mattel and the two governments acted like grown-ups, though not without pressure and arm-twisting. Mattel could take needed steps on its own because its primary constituency was its stockholders. In contrast, environmental progress, labor protection, intellectual piracy, and financial transparency are negotiated before larger and less well-informed audiences. Arms control and military competition play to even larger and more emotional constituencies.
The "Big Bad China" story still grabs headlines, commentators of various persuasions still issue flip clichés, and politicians still slip into China bashing. Since Chinese still see themselves as the rising, hardworking, high-achieving underdogs denied respect, they bristle at uninformed American self-righteousness and retaliate in kind. Yet Chinese and Americans need to acknowledge that they have much in common and can both benefit from working together.
Achievable progress can be torpedoed by feckless posturing but strengthened by tough negotiations on the basis of both national self-interest and what Zhou called "equality and mutual benefit."
There are no more China cards; let there be no more China sticks.
Read entire article at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu
The toy company Mattel has apologized for blaming China for the recall of millions of toys. It turns out that most of the recalls were caused by design flaws. Can we add this sorry affair to the list of flaps, scares, and panics that have marked relations between our two countries since 1949?
The "who lost China?" flap and Chinese anti-American scare campaigns of the 1950s kicked off a generation-long mutual panic which made genuine differences between the two countries hard to negotiate. Then U.S. President Richard Nixon visited in 1972, in part, to play the "China card" against Moscow. This was a realist course of action, as was Washington's response (or rather non-response) to the suppression of the Democracy Movement of 1989.
American presidential candidates have a habit of using China as a stick to cudgel the opposition. Of course, once elected, the candidate soon discovers why basic China policy hasn't changed since Nixon: outsiders can do little to change China if they don't engage the leaders of China. We strive to hit the right balance between winking at its transgressions and pushing for changes.
The 1990s and early 2000s saw a series of flaps. Chinese campaign contributions, the arrest of alleged spy Wen Ho-lee, bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and downing of an American spy plane were among them. The post-9/11 war on terror only papered over conflicts.
Each of these scares had a basis; the two countries have different interests. Still, strung together, these flaps bring to mind the old Chinese observation that once you have been bitten by a snake, you will panic when you see a piece of rope.
In China, there is no less touchiness. The Olympics next summer are an honor which Chinese felt was unjustly delayed. While we should all pray "No Flaps, please," problems will certainly arise, ranging from killer air and water pollution to demonstrations from Falun Gong and Tibetan sympathizers. There will be provocations, incidents, and crackdowns. If we are not careful, we will find ourselves back in crisis mode.
Chinese popular pride, euphoria, and indignation are not manufactured. The regime can at best channel or deflect them, though also exploiting them as a means of replacing faded revolutionary fervor. But recent studies using newly available classified documents confirm that in the diplomatic dance leading up to Henry Kissinger's "Operation Marco Polo" in 1971, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai knew that Americans needed the "China card" to triangulate against the Soviets and to influence the North Vietnamese. China equally needed American support against Soviet nuclear threats, yet American demonstrations of respect were crucial. Without them, China would not have negotiated.
On the U.S. side, the toxic toy menace tapped a nerve in something the way that a doctor produces that famous knee jerk -- one small tap in the right place. True, toxic toothpaste, pet food, or toys are alarming. But they are more frightening for Chinese consumers, tens of thousands of whom suffer each year from defective or fraudulent drugs, contaminated foods, or weak safety standards.
The fundamental problem is not just the totalitarian control of the country by the Chinese Communist Party. The impressive rate of economic growth for more than a quarter of a century is highly worthy of respect, even though this success produced pollution, corruption, piracy of intellectual property, destruction of water sources and any number of dire problems.
The bigger challenge for the government, paradoxically, is to break out of a cycle of ineffectiveness, especially outside the major cities. The state lacks the legitimacy to elicit compliance without force, but the use of force further drains legitimacy. The central government passes laws, spews out regulations, strikes moralistic stances, and makes promises. Dramatic actions are taken and corrupt officials are arrested -- even executed -- but when one problem is addressed, others get worse. Local officials who are worried about jobs and revenues are not eager to listen to Beijing's orders to kill the goose that lays the golden egg, never mind that the goose leaves droppings all over the place.
The toy flap showed ways to achieve some good. The American media now do far better than before in presenting China's problems in perspective. We get better results when the question is not "what crimes have you committed against us?" but "what can benefit us both?" On the issue of toy safety, Mattel and the two governments acted like grown-ups, though not without pressure and arm-twisting. Mattel could take needed steps on its own because its primary constituency was its stockholders. In contrast, environmental progress, labor protection, intellectual piracy, and financial transparency are negotiated before larger and less well-informed audiences. Arms control and military competition play to even larger and more emotional constituencies.
The "Big Bad China" story still grabs headlines, commentators of various persuasions still issue flip clichés, and politicians still slip into China bashing. Since Chinese still see themselves as the rising, hardworking, high-achieving underdogs denied respect, they bristle at uninformed American self-righteousness and retaliate in kind. Yet Chinese and Americans need to acknowledge that they have much in common and can both benefit from working together.
Achievable progress can be torpedoed by feckless posturing but strengthened by tough negotiations on the basis of both national self-interest and what Zhou called "equality and mutual benefit."
There are no more China cards; let there be no more China sticks.