Victor Davis Hanson: Kosovo Was Then, This Is Now ...
Quite apart from the undeniable merits of independence, in political terms Kosovo 2008 is not quite Kosovo of 1998. Let us count the post-9/11 ways:
1. The rise of radical Islam, especially in Europe, has made Western publics edgy about Muslim-identified states, especially inside Europe.
2. Russia is no longer a basket case, but rearming, aggressive, overflowing with petro-dollars, and eager to use oil — and more — as a weapon.
3. Milosevic is long dead.
4. For six years there has been a steady anti-American drumbeat in Europe and caricatures of the use of “preemption” and “unilateralism”; Euros have so turned off Americans that there is no support for reintervention to solve a “European” problem that should of course, if it worsens, be adjudicated at the Hague and other European Utopian agencies.
5. This was a Clinton thing, and predated George W. Bush. The current tension reminds us of our forgotten American Balkan presence, that seems to have been necessary for the past decade — and without a treaty no less! And did we ever ask Congress to bomb over there, or did we go to the sacrosanct U.N.? Suddenly there are few liberal Harry Reid/Nancy Pelosi talking points to be heard on Kosovo.
6. After Afghanistan and Iraq, there is no likelihood that Americans want a third war, especially for Kosovo. Can you imagine the EU begging the Texan, twangy Halliburtonite, bible-thumping George Bush to please do something now!? I imagine right now President Bush is getting a different sort of phone call from his European friends, “Yo George?”
7. Yet given NATO’s dismal performance in Afghanistan, it has little fides in the Balkans, and the American attitude might be ‘you didn’t want to fight much for Afghanistan, so why should we for Kosovo?’
8. There is some EU support, especially in Eastern Europe and among Orthodox and Greek-speaking communities, for Serbia. Perhaps unfaddish and most un-European, but support nonetheless.
Where does all this leave us? It might be a fine and noble thing for the Kosovars to have their own state like the rest of the regions of the former Yugoslavia. But let us pray that neither Serbia nor Russia calls the Western bluff about guaranteeing Kosovar autonomy, because in the present climate it really would be, well, a big fat bluff.
Read entire article at National Review Online
1. The rise of radical Islam, especially in Europe, has made Western publics edgy about Muslim-identified states, especially inside Europe.
2. Russia is no longer a basket case, but rearming, aggressive, overflowing with petro-dollars, and eager to use oil — and more — as a weapon.
3. Milosevic is long dead.
4. For six years there has been a steady anti-American drumbeat in Europe and caricatures of the use of “preemption” and “unilateralism”; Euros have so turned off Americans that there is no support for reintervention to solve a “European” problem that should of course, if it worsens, be adjudicated at the Hague and other European Utopian agencies.
5. This was a Clinton thing, and predated George W. Bush. The current tension reminds us of our forgotten American Balkan presence, that seems to have been necessary for the past decade — and without a treaty no less! And did we ever ask Congress to bomb over there, or did we go to the sacrosanct U.N.? Suddenly there are few liberal Harry Reid/Nancy Pelosi talking points to be heard on Kosovo.
6. After Afghanistan and Iraq, there is no likelihood that Americans want a third war, especially for Kosovo. Can you imagine the EU begging the Texan, twangy Halliburtonite, bible-thumping George Bush to please do something now!? I imagine right now President Bush is getting a different sort of phone call from his European friends, “Yo George?”
7. Yet given NATO’s dismal performance in Afghanistan, it has little fides in the Balkans, and the American attitude might be ‘you didn’t want to fight much for Afghanistan, so why should we for Kosovo?’
8. There is some EU support, especially in Eastern Europe and among Orthodox and Greek-speaking communities, for Serbia. Perhaps unfaddish and most un-European, but support nonetheless.
Where does all this leave us? It might be a fine and noble thing for the Kosovars to have their own state like the rest of the regions of the former Yugoslavia. But let us pray that neither Serbia nor Russia calls the Western bluff about guaranteeing Kosovar autonomy, because in the present climate it really would be, well, a big fat bluff.