Sir Anthony Eden's cabinet discussed concealing Suez 'collusion', records show
Detailed notes of discussions during the Suez crisis of 1956 taken by the Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook show the extent to which the British Government sought to cover up its "collusion" with Israel as a pretext for invasion of Egyptian territory after Nasser's nationalisation of the strategically important waterway.
Previous documents have confirmed that Eden held secret talks with French officials in October 1956 to formulate a plan in which Israel was to attack Egypt allowing France and Britain to step in, supposedly as peace keepers, to seize the canal.
Following Israel's invasion on October 29, Britain and France made a joint move on Port Said in Egypt on the night of November 5 to 6. But the adventure ended in humiliation for the two countries when they were forced to withdraw under pressure from the United States as well as the UN and Soviet Union.
The secret Anglo-French plan was concealed from the public at the time and Prime Minister Eden actively denied any knowledge of Israeli action to the House of Commons.
But Sir Norman's notes of the cabinet discussions show the extent to which the cabinet was aware of the plan, first fretting over indications that Israel was considering backing out of the invasion and then following its progress closely once it had begun.
Details of discussions covering the entire period of the crisis are contained in Sir Norman's official diary, which has been released to the National Archives for the first time.
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Previous documents have confirmed that Eden held secret talks with French officials in October 1956 to formulate a plan in which Israel was to attack Egypt allowing France and Britain to step in, supposedly as peace keepers, to seize the canal.
Following Israel's invasion on October 29, Britain and France made a joint move on Port Said in Egypt on the night of November 5 to 6. But the adventure ended in humiliation for the two countries when they were forced to withdraw under pressure from the United States as well as the UN and Soviet Union.
The secret Anglo-French plan was concealed from the public at the time and Prime Minister Eden actively denied any knowledge of Israeli action to the House of Commons.
But Sir Norman's notes of the cabinet discussions show the extent to which the cabinet was aware of the plan, first fretting over indications that Israel was considering backing out of the invasion and then following its progress closely once it had begun.
Details of discussions covering the entire period of the crisis are contained in Sir Norman's official diary, which has been released to the National Archives for the first time.