Andreas Umland: Was Medvedev Exposed?
[Dr Andreas Umland is editor of the book series "Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society" (www.ibidem-verlag.de/spps.html) and administrator of the web site "Russian Nationalism" (groups.yahoo.com/group/russian_nationalism/).]
The clearer the larger implications of Russia’s latest adventure in the Caucasus become, the more the Russian leadership’s actions, in August 2008, look dysfunctional. A growing number of repercussions of Russia’s overreaction to Georgia’s deeds in South Ossetia have, by now, added up to a significant loss in Moscow’s international standing. To be sure, further escalation in Moscow’s already strained relations with the United States had been, most probably, expected and, perhaps, even desired by many politicians and pundits in Moscow. Yet, as becomes more obvious with every week passing, other setbacks in Russia’s relations to various countries are increasingly outweighing any gains that Russia’s leadership may be reaping from its show of military strength, diplomatic stubbornness and political resoluteness with regard to the two small separatist territories in Georgia.
Whether the elites of Western and Eastern Europe, or the leaders of Central and South-East Asia – most international actors of relevance to Russia’s foreign affairs reacted with open or cryptic disapproval. Whereas many European comments have been hardly less critical than American assessments of Russia’s behaviour in the Caucasus, Asia’s leaders followed a line of demonstrative neutrality. The latter even concerns countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia or Uzbekistan that have been among the closest allies of Moscow in the post-Soviet sphere. In Ukraine, as a result of Russian behaviour in the Caucasus, the population’s hitherto low support for NATO membership has markedly risen. As East Europeans are becoming fearful of Russia again, pro-Russian political factions and interest groups in Kyiv, Budapest, Sofia or Warsaw are loosing ground. Moreover, in the Baltics, Ukraine or Central Asia, these countries’ significant Russian diasporas are viewed with growing suspicion that, one day, the minorities may transform into “fifth columns” of Moscow. Instead, Russia gets open support for its actions in Georgia, or for her recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the leaders of Nicaragua or Venezuela – countries of, at best, secondary relevance to her international affairs and economic interests. Against this background, it looks as if Russia’s political and military leaders made a gross mistake when they first provoked Tbilisi and later reacted to the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali the way they did. Russia’s patriots, it would appear, miscalculated the impact that these actions would have on their nation’s international standing. They were playing against their own interests.
Or did they? Perhaps, the logic of Russian behaviour towards Georgia during the last months was an entirely different one? Could it be that its results are, in fact, not in contradiction to, but in accord with, salient interests of numerous political actors in Moscow? Why did these events happen shortly after Dmitry Medvedev’s election for President, and before he managed to consolidate his new position?
Ever since Medvedev’s nomination as presidential candidate, in both Western countries and pro-Western circles throughout Russia, there have been hopes that Medvedev’s election would usher in a “thaw” in Russian domestic and foreign affairs. Being one of the youngest political leaders in the upper echelons of the Kremlin hierarchy, Medvedev is without a CPSU or KGB background. Having developed a relatively pro-Western profile with his public statements already before his election, Medvedev’s advance into the Kremlin noticeably improved the tone in Russian-Western relations and signalled a re-liberalization of Russian public life. Whereas Putin’s regency was marked by a constant deterioration of Russia’s democratic credentials and relations to the West, Medvedev managed, already in his first weeks as President, to change the mood in Russian public life and quickly set up trustful relationships with various European leaders. Some of his first domestic initiatives, such as his ardent support for small and medium businesses, militant stance against corruption, or repeated calls for action against skinhead violence by Russia’s security services, pointed in the same direction.
While welcomed by many in Russia and the West, these tendencies, however, jeopardized a number of particularistic interests that have come to dominate Russia under Putin. They include legions of security service and army officers now populating the offices of Russia’s state organs and companies, various known politicians who have made themselves names with their support for an authoritarian system and anti-Western policies, as well as a wide array of prolific pundits and theorists who earn their money by providing extravagant interpretations of current Russian and world affairs as well as the devious role of the West in them. It was under Putin’s neo-byzantine political system that these people rose and thrived. With the promotion of Medvedev, Russian public life was under the threat of being normalized. In an outwardly open and domestically democratic country, there would be fewer political opportunities for these actors, and no high positions on the social ladder to occupy left.
After the five-day war against Georgia this August, things are in their place again: Russia and the West are on the brink of a new Cold War. Public discourse is about the need for the Russian state to be strong enough for such a confrontation. Medvedev’s stated initial aims – opening and democratizing the country – appear as dangerous luxury, in this new political context. While the Russian nation looses from being again driven into the position of an international pariah, many influential people in Moscow, especially the constituency of radically anti-American politicians and pundits, win.
In view of the dismal result of Russia’s recent policies in the Caucasus, the question suggests itself whether Medvedev has been indeed shaping them, or whether he was forced to follow a script not written by himself. Once Russian passports were handed out to South Ossetians and Georgia was provoked to attack them, there was little choice for the Russian President than to react the way he did. It looks, moreover, as if Medvedev, at first, hesitated to use force. It was Putin who, being at the Olympic games in Bejing, first commented on the Georgian actions and called them "genocide." On short notice, Putin flew directly to the North Caucasus, to take command.
Perhaps, we will never know for sure to which degree Medvedev either acted or reacted during and after the Russian-Georgian war. However, the dubious prehistory and doubtful gains of Russia’s disproportionate military action in Georgia give reason for thought. They suggest that the causes behind the war in Georgia might have more to do with internal elite struggle’s in Moscow than with Russia’s foreign policy aims, in general, or her interests, on the Caucasus, in particular.
Read entire article at Asia Times Online
The clearer the larger implications of Russia’s latest adventure in the Caucasus become, the more the Russian leadership’s actions, in August 2008, look dysfunctional. A growing number of repercussions of Russia’s overreaction to Georgia’s deeds in South Ossetia have, by now, added up to a significant loss in Moscow’s international standing. To be sure, further escalation in Moscow’s already strained relations with the United States had been, most probably, expected and, perhaps, even desired by many politicians and pundits in Moscow. Yet, as becomes more obvious with every week passing, other setbacks in Russia’s relations to various countries are increasingly outweighing any gains that Russia’s leadership may be reaping from its show of military strength, diplomatic stubbornness and political resoluteness with regard to the two small separatist territories in Georgia.
Whether the elites of Western and Eastern Europe, or the leaders of Central and South-East Asia – most international actors of relevance to Russia’s foreign affairs reacted with open or cryptic disapproval. Whereas many European comments have been hardly less critical than American assessments of Russia’s behaviour in the Caucasus, Asia’s leaders followed a line of demonstrative neutrality. The latter even concerns countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia or Uzbekistan that have been among the closest allies of Moscow in the post-Soviet sphere. In Ukraine, as a result of Russian behaviour in the Caucasus, the population’s hitherto low support for NATO membership has markedly risen. As East Europeans are becoming fearful of Russia again, pro-Russian political factions and interest groups in Kyiv, Budapest, Sofia or Warsaw are loosing ground. Moreover, in the Baltics, Ukraine or Central Asia, these countries’ significant Russian diasporas are viewed with growing suspicion that, one day, the minorities may transform into “fifth columns” of Moscow. Instead, Russia gets open support for its actions in Georgia, or for her recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the leaders of Nicaragua or Venezuela – countries of, at best, secondary relevance to her international affairs and economic interests. Against this background, it looks as if Russia’s political and military leaders made a gross mistake when they first provoked Tbilisi and later reacted to the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali the way they did. Russia’s patriots, it would appear, miscalculated the impact that these actions would have on their nation’s international standing. They were playing against their own interests.
Or did they? Perhaps, the logic of Russian behaviour towards Georgia during the last months was an entirely different one? Could it be that its results are, in fact, not in contradiction to, but in accord with, salient interests of numerous political actors in Moscow? Why did these events happen shortly after Dmitry Medvedev’s election for President, and before he managed to consolidate his new position?
Ever since Medvedev’s nomination as presidential candidate, in both Western countries and pro-Western circles throughout Russia, there have been hopes that Medvedev’s election would usher in a “thaw” in Russian domestic and foreign affairs. Being one of the youngest political leaders in the upper echelons of the Kremlin hierarchy, Medvedev is without a CPSU or KGB background. Having developed a relatively pro-Western profile with his public statements already before his election, Medvedev’s advance into the Kremlin noticeably improved the tone in Russian-Western relations and signalled a re-liberalization of Russian public life. Whereas Putin’s regency was marked by a constant deterioration of Russia’s democratic credentials and relations to the West, Medvedev managed, already in his first weeks as President, to change the mood in Russian public life and quickly set up trustful relationships with various European leaders. Some of his first domestic initiatives, such as his ardent support for small and medium businesses, militant stance against corruption, or repeated calls for action against skinhead violence by Russia’s security services, pointed in the same direction.
While welcomed by many in Russia and the West, these tendencies, however, jeopardized a number of particularistic interests that have come to dominate Russia under Putin. They include legions of security service and army officers now populating the offices of Russia’s state organs and companies, various known politicians who have made themselves names with their support for an authoritarian system and anti-Western policies, as well as a wide array of prolific pundits and theorists who earn their money by providing extravagant interpretations of current Russian and world affairs as well as the devious role of the West in them. It was under Putin’s neo-byzantine political system that these people rose and thrived. With the promotion of Medvedev, Russian public life was under the threat of being normalized. In an outwardly open and domestically democratic country, there would be fewer political opportunities for these actors, and no high positions on the social ladder to occupy left.
After the five-day war against Georgia this August, things are in their place again: Russia and the West are on the brink of a new Cold War. Public discourse is about the need for the Russian state to be strong enough for such a confrontation. Medvedev’s stated initial aims – opening and democratizing the country – appear as dangerous luxury, in this new political context. While the Russian nation looses from being again driven into the position of an international pariah, many influential people in Moscow, especially the constituency of radically anti-American politicians and pundits, win.
In view of the dismal result of Russia’s recent policies in the Caucasus, the question suggests itself whether Medvedev has been indeed shaping them, or whether he was forced to follow a script not written by himself. Once Russian passports were handed out to South Ossetians and Georgia was provoked to attack them, there was little choice for the Russian President than to react the way he did. It looks, moreover, as if Medvedev, at first, hesitated to use force. It was Putin who, being at the Olympic games in Bejing, first commented on the Georgian actions and called them "genocide." On short notice, Putin flew directly to the North Caucasus, to take command.
Perhaps, we will never know for sure to which degree Medvedev either acted or reacted during and after the Russian-Georgian war. However, the dubious prehistory and doubtful gains of Russia’s disproportionate military action in Georgia give reason for thought. They suggest that the causes behind the war in Georgia might have more to do with internal elite struggle’s in Moscow than with Russia’s foreign policy aims, in general, or her interests, on the Caucasus, in particular.