Greg Sheridan: I come to hail chief, not bury him
[Greg Sheridan is Foreign editor at The Australian.]
In 1963, South Vietnam's president Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated in a military coup backed by the Americans, though they didn't back his murder. To cover the assassination, the slander was put out that Diem, a devout Catholic, had committed suicide. Santa was torn. He wanted to defend Diem and denounce the Americans for the most foolish thing they did in Vietnam. But with a federal election looming he worried that he might diminish support for the US alliance. In the end Santa robustly defended Diem and denounced Washington's folly.
Later his great friend, archbishop Daniel Mannix, told Santa he haddone the right thing. For, he said, you must always be loyal to your friends, especially when they are dead and the whole world is against them.
Right now the whole world is absurdly against Bush. If he jumped in front of a speeding train to rescue an old woman he would be accused of cynically promoting US rail interests. In time, I'm sure, a more balanced understanding of Bush's achievements, as well as his failures, will emerge. But right now he's about as popular as a Wall Street stockbroker at a pensioners' rally.
Any defence of Bush and his administration must acknowledge its faults because, more than in any other administration, the virtues and the vices have been two sides of the same coin. Bush's biggest failing was his inability to speak persuasively to an international audience. His stubbornness, which is courage if you look at it a different way, was amplified for foreign audiences a thousand times by the Texan accent. In rejecting elite American opinion, he too often looked as though he was rejecting international opinion. In dismissing The New York Times, he seemed to dismiss Europe.
His other big fault was his failure to exert himself to ensure his administration was unified, especially during its first term. Having appointed big beasts such as Dick Cheney, Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld, Bush needed to stamp his authority on them more and adjudicate their disputes.
Instead, the Bush administration looked at times like a medieval court with warring princes under a troubled king. It got better during the second term.
Third, there were bad mistakes in implementation in Iraq. There was also a failure to pursue energy independence, even to the point of resisting fuel efficiency improvements in motor vehicles, which was part of a broader failure to articulate a coherent response to climate change, where his record was better than his rhetoric.
Finally, there was a failure on hiswatch to properly regulate the financial system, a failure he shares in full measure with congressional Democrats.
Now, the successes. Barack Obama in some measure owes his success to the inclusiveness of Bush. Bush appointed Powell secretary of state. He appointed Condoleezza Rice national security adviser, then Secretary of State. Over eight years, this accustomed the electorate to African-Americans handling critical national security positions. No other president, certainly no Democrat, had done anything like it. Bush was always a liberal on race, always way ahead of his party on immigration and the need for Republicans to woo racial minorities, particularly Hispanics. Without embracing the rhetoric of identity politics, he simply did things that advanced racial equality.
More important, especially for Australia, Bush was an immensely successful president in Asia. When Bush was first elected there was great fear of a conflict between the US and China. Instead, Bush from the start pursued a steady, productive and stable relationship with China. He didn't sell out Taiwan but he shrewdly and effectively manipulated downwards the vote of its pro-independence candidates by withholding US favour from them. He resisted any protectionist moves against Beijing. He had a much better China relationship than Bill Clinton did.
Similarly, the US-India nuclear deal, which symbolises the entire new strategic relationship with India, compares in historical import with Richard Nixon's opening to China. Likewise with Japan. Bush encouraged Tokyo to become an independent strategic partner within the framework of the US alliance. This removes the crippling psychological burden of strategic client status for Japan and, by making the US-Japan alliance militarily reciprocal, enormously strengthens the US position in North Asia.
The US reduced the footprint of its troop presence in Japan and South Korea while keeping those alliances strong. It re-established a healthy priority for Southeast Asia. US poll figures in most of Asia were better towards the end of the Bush administration than at its start.
From Australia's point of view, Bush gave us every single thing we seriously wanted, from a free trade agreement to historically important new intelligence sharing arrangements. In July 2004 Bush sent a presidential directive to the CIA and the US Defence Department that mandated Australian access to US intelligence classified as "no forn", meaning not to be seen by foreign eyes. Similarly, selected Australian institutions were given direct access to US intelligence systems. Former prime minister John Howard ran the US relationship brilliantly and secured huge, long-term institutional advantages for Australia out of it.
More generally, Bush was always ready to take Australian interests into account. Almost certainly we will never again have as good a friend in the White House. His first administration contained a group of senior officials - Cheney, Rich Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, Bob Zoellick - with very deep Australian connections, and a doctrine that put solid allies ahead of all others. Howard sensibly took maximum advantage of all that this offered.
Bush doesn't get the credit he deserves for greatly increasing US aid to Africa, especially on AIDS. In reality no Democratic president would have done more.
Much of history's judgment of Bush will turn on Iraq and Afghanistan...
Read entire article at The Australian
In 1963, South Vietnam's president Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated in a military coup backed by the Americans, though they didn't back his murder. To cover the assassination, the slander was put out that Diem, a devout Catholic, had committed suicide. Santa was torn. He wanted to defend Diem and denounce the Americans for the most foolish thing they did in Vietnam. But with a federal election looming he worried that he might diminish support for the US alliance. In the end Santa robustly defended Diem and denounced Washington's folly.
Later his great friend, archbishop Daniel Mannix, told Santa he haddone the right thing. For, he said, you must always be loyal to your friends, especially when they are dead and the whole world is against them.
Right now the whole world is absurdly against Bush. If he jumped in front of a speeding train to rescue an old woman he would be accused of cynically promoting US rail interests. In time, I'm sure, a more balanced understanding of Bush's achievements, as well as his failures, will emerge. But right now he's about as popular as a Wall Street stockbroker at a pensioners' rally.
Any defence of Bush and his administration must acknowledge its faults because, more than in any other administration, the virtues and the vices have been two sides of the same coin. Bush's biggest failing was his inability to speak persuasively to an international audience. His stubbornness, which is courage if you look at it a different way, was amplified for foreign audiences a thousand times by the Texan accent. In rejecting elite American opinion, he too often looked as though he was rejecting international opinion. In dismissing The New York Times, he seemed to dismiss Europe.
His other big fault was his failure to exert himself to ensure his administration was unified, especially during its first term. Having appointed big beasts such as Dick Cheney, Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld, Bush needed to stamp his authority on them more and adjudicate their disputes.
Instead, the Bush administration looked at times like a medieval court with warring princes under a troubled king. It got better during the second term.
Third, there were bad mistakes in implementation in Iraq. There was also a failure to pursue energy independence, even to the point of resisting fuel efficiency improvements in motor vehicles, which was part of a broader failure to articulate a coherent response to climate change, where his record was better than his rhetoric.
Finally, there was a failure on hiswatch to properly regulate the financial system, a failure he shares in full measure with congressional Democrats.
Now, the successes. Barack Obama in some measure owes his success to the inclusiveness of Bush. Bush appointed Powell secretary of state. He appointed Condoleezza Rice national security adviser, then Secretary of State. Over eight years, this accustomed the electorate to African-Americans handling critical national security positions. No other president, certainly no Democrat, had done anything like it. Bush was always a liberal on race, always way ahead of his party on immigration and the need for Republicans to woo racial minorities, particularly Hispanics. Without embracing the rhetoric of identity politics, he simply did things that advanced racial equality.
More important, especially for Australia, Bush was an immensely successful president in Asia. When Bush was first elected there was great fear of a conflict between the US and China. Instead, Bush from the start pursued a steady, productive and stable relationship with China. He didn't sell out Taiwan but he shrewdly and effectively manipulated downwards the vote of its pro-independence candidates by withholding US favour from them. He resisted any protectionist moves against Beijing. He had a much better China relationship than Bill Clinton did.
Similarly, the US-India nuclear deal, which symbolises the entire new strategic relationship with India, compares in historical import with Richard Nixon's opening to China. Likewise with Japan. Bush encouraged Tokyo to become an independent strategic partner within the framework of the US alliance. This removes the crippling psychological burden of strategic client status for Japan and, by making the US-Japan alliance militarily reciprocal, enormously strengthens the US position in North Asia.
The US reduced the footprint of its troop presence in Japan and South Korea while keeping those alliances strong. It re-established a healthy priority for Southeast Asia. US poll figures in most of Asia were better towards the end of the Bush administration than at its start.
From Australia's point of view, Bush gave us every single thing we seriously wanted, from a free trade agreement to historically important new intelligence sharing arrangements. In July 2004 Bush sent a presidential directive to the CIA and the US Defence Department that mandated Australian access to US intelligence classified as "no forn", meaning not to be seen by foreign eyes. Similarly, selected Australian institutions were given direct access to US intelligence systems. Former prime minister John Howard ran the US relationship brilliantly and secured huge, long-term institutional advantages for Australia out of it.
More generally, Bush was always ready to take Australian interests into account. Almost certainly we will never again have as good a friend in the White House. His first administration contained a group of senior officials - Cheney, Rich Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, Bob Zoellick - with very deep Australian connections, and a doctrine that put solid allies ahead of all others. Howard sensibly took maximum advantage of all that this offered.
Bush doesn't get the credit he deserves for greatly increasing US aid to Africa, especially on AIDS. In reality no Democratic president would have done more.
Much of history's judgment of Bush will turn on Iraq and Afghanistan...