Column: Letters from Korea: Jeju--Shhhhhhh! Don't Ask! (Part 1)
This is the first of two essays about Jeju Island, South Korea--a subject about which it appears we do not want to ask questions. The questions we don't want to ask concern war crimes--including mass murders of civilians--perhaps as many as 80,000. The United States was involved. The events started in 1947, but most atrocities occurred in 1948 and 1949.
I am raising questions about Jeju. I am not the first to ask the questions. Others have spoken to the topic. Yet when I ask knowledgeable academic colleagues about Jeju Island (also known as Cheju Island), South Korea, persons who know a lot more about history than I do (my degree is in Political Science, and I consider myself nothing more than a tourist-historian, or an armchair historian), they either respond that they have never even heard of the island, or they are oblivious to any events that occurred there following the Second World War.
I want to see a bright flashlight shine on what may have been the worst episode of crimes and atrocities against civilians in the period immediately after the Second World War. I want to see the true culprits revealed. Even if they are revered as heroes today. The leader of South Korea has given a formal apology for the participation of the South Korean military in the Jeju atrocities. But questions remain to be asked--and asked out loud. How many thousands of civilians were killed? Who were the rebels? Were they part of a North Korean or Communist offensive? Were the rebels involved in the atrocities? To what extent? But most importantly, we must realize that the United States government was in charge of both domestic and military policy in Korea when most of these atrocities occurred. We have to ask--to what extent did the Americans aid South Koreans in killing civilians of Jeju? And, did our Armies participate directly in any of the atrocities? Those asking should be ready to identify the culprits involved in the events of 1948 and 1949.
The Clark Tribunal Asked--But They Refused to Answer--Just Who?
Many of the questions posed above were raised in a mock trial designated as
the "Korean International War Crimes Tribunal," held at the International
Action Center in New York City on June 23, 2001. The tribunal responded to an
indictment made on June 16, 2001, by Ramsey Clark, formerly attorney general
of the United States. The indictment cites "every president, every secretary
of state, and every secretary of the Navy and Defense" serving during and
after September 1945 for being "engaged in a course of conduct intended
to deny sovereignty and independence to the people of Korea" and trying
to "destroy in major part the population."
While Clark waves the wand of guilt over "every" person serving in specific jobs since 1945, he takes pains to list specific individuals in his indictment. Amazingly he includes George W. Bush in the indictment. "W" was eight months old when the Jeju atrocities began and three years old when they ended. Original sin, I guess. Clark also names Colin Powell. He leaves his father and himself off the indictment list.
Ramsey Clark also served as a prosecutor during the mock trial. Many war crimes were documented, including crimes ongoing at the time of the trial. Jeju Island events from 1947 to 1949 were included among the specifics in the evidence presented to Clark's tribunal. The Jeju incidents were documented in a report presented by massacre witness Lee Do Young, and also in a written report prepared for a Tokyo conference in 1998 by Professor Bruce Cummings. ("The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Chejudo Uprising," March 14, 1998.)
An international jury listened and unanimously convicted all indicted on all counts. Ergo, "W" was convicted for the crimes of 1947, 1948, and 1949. But this essay is not about Clark's "fair trial," and it's not about "W." It is about events the took place on Jeju in 1947, 1948, and 1949. While his broad stroke indictment seems a bit reckless, at least Clark brought these episodes up for a cursory public viewing. Maybe more light and less heat is called for at the moment.
Some Background
When I dwell on what "Korea" represents on the world stage, I think
also of Poland. Both seem to be pawns caught between large competing and dominating
forces. Korea is caught between China and Japan and Russia, and the United States--since
1871 anyway. It was 1871 when we ran gunboats up the Han River toward Seoul
as we sought trade concession from the reclusive authorities in Korea. We were
feeling our oats from our "successes" in opening up Japan to international
commerce. The Koreans repelled our advances that time. However, they could not
keep the Chinese, Russians and the Japanese out. The spark to the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904 was an incident over who would control development in Korea. Japan won
the war, and our president, Theodore Roosevelt was given the Nobel Peace Prize
for negotiating a peaceful settlement to the hostilities.
Concomitant with his Peace Award, our president made a secret agreement with
the Japanese. The United States pledged not to interfere with any Japanese excursions
into Korea, and Japan, in turn agreed to a hands-off policy regarding our occupation
of the Philippines--which we had seized at the end of the Spanish American War.
Japan did occupy Korea and in 1910 annexed the "pawn" and made it
a colony.
Unfortunately, the Koreans were unaware of the agreement. After listening to Woodrow Wilson give his "14 Points" speech calling for the self-determination of nations in 1919, many Koreans believed that the great victors of the First World War meant what they said. The speech was censored in Korea, but Korean students in Tokyo heard it and they acted as if Wilson meant what he said. They organized mainland Koreans in massive protests against Japanese, and they proclaimed independence with a document modeled after Jefferson's (or should we say Locke's) own. The result--Japanese fired upon the protesters, rounded them up, and killed an estimated 7500, and wounded 16,000. They waited for help from the United States. Wilson was non-responsive.
Americans spoke again in 1943 at the Cairo Conference. It was agreed that Japanese possessions such as Korea would become independent at the end of the War. While we used "fudge" words such as "when feasible," and the like, the Koreans heard only the basic words. Again they were disappointed.
With our full knowledge that Japan was certainly going to be defeated by our own forces, at Yalta in February 1945 we invited (secretly) the Soviet Union to declare war on Japan--which it did the day after we dropped the bomb on Hiroshima.
Roosevelt's--and Truman's--"intelligence" must have been aware of the evil intentions of the Soviets. Yet we willingly "gave" the Soviets an "occupation" zone (Dean Rusk negotiated a line at the 38th parallel) of Korea, and we honored the agreement. What justification was there for us to occupy Korea? Korea had not been at war with us. What justification was there for us to allow the Soviet occupation? Our actions were accompanied by pronouncements that Korea would not be independent, but rather, would be under our ("UN"?) rule, "trusteeship" for five years. At first we had suggested a thirty year trusteeship--almost as long a time as Japan had occupied Korea.
The disappointment to the Koreans was overwhelming when they learned of the American and Soviet intentions. The people of Jeju, however, were not too upset. They saw their Japanese rulers leave, and the Americans seemed to neglect the island. Therefore their "people's committees" in the several towns and cities on the island began to develop a sense of self-rule and autonomy. But this turned out to be but another false sense of well being.
Jeju Island citizens became upset when the U. S. military began to put together the South Korean regime of Syngmun Rhee. With the force of U.S. arms behind them, the regime moved its administrators into the island and began to take over the role of local government. The U.S. military had certain deficiencies. One was language. Another was the lack of administrative expertise. Solution: As the Americans rounded up the Japanese colonial masters from Korea, they found among the group many with experience running affairs in Korea. Instead of sending them off to Guantanamo, the Japanese were returned to their administrative posts, only this time, they were reporting to the Americans. The Japanese were especially desired for roles in the police forces.
On March 1, 1947, Jeju residents organized a very large protest against their new (and retained) colonial masters. The organizational efforts were pushed by the "people's committees." The American forces, who had proclaimed often that the Jeju people were passive and cooperative, were now a target. The police, many of whom were Japanese, fired upon the crowds, killing six civilians and injuring eight. The seeds of the 1948 uprising were planted. (Ko Chang-Hoon and Kim June-Ho, "Peace network," in Peace Island, v. 2 [2004], pp. 8-10.)
In the next essay we see the unfolding of atrocities.