Column: Letters from Korea: Jeju--Shhhhhhh! Don't Ask! (Part 2)
This is the second of two articles Mr. Thompson has written about Jeju. Click here for the first.
The rebellious outbreak on Jeju Island, South Korea is referred to as 4.3 as it started on April 3, 1948. Precipitating events consisted of discontent over the American occupation and that of troops from the central South Korean regime which was in its early stages of forming under Syngman Rhee's leadership. Jeju residents were especially upset that the United Nations had abandoned the quest for unifying elections, and that elections for a South Korean government were to take place in May. They saw the elections as being but a tool to set Rhee in place as a leader who would be beholden to the American occupiers. The elections would also represented a repudiation of local rule--in actuality, autonomous rule--by the Jeju people's committees. Islanders were also suffering food shortages, and protests were directed toward grievances on this matter.
On April 3, small rebel groups attacked eleven police stations on the island. Three of the rebels were killed along with four policemen and twelve persons known as "rightists." The police were a likely target as their units employed former Japanese police people as well as right wing youth groups, many refugees from North Korea, and all rather cruel in their relations with independent and left wing Jeju citizens. (Ko and Kim). The rebels also cut all telephone lines on the island. (New York Times, April 21, 1948). They also fired shots at an U. S. Army C-47 which purportedly was delivering supplies to the South Korean constabulatory, which after the elections became the Republic of Korea Army. (New York Times, April 26, 1948).
In May 1948 the elections were held in South Korea, although they were delayed on Jeju for most of a year. The elections stimulated new protests and disturbances. Many election stations were destroyed as were buildings that registered voters and kept registration records. In May, 35 police were killed. At this point the Americans intervened. While several military leaders called for calm, and urged that civilians be treated peacefully, others gave the "wink and O.K." to the Koreans to put the rebels down. Perhaps more. One report suggests that Americans equipped the South Koreans putting down the rebellions, that the American military gave intelligence, planned actions, and even commanded some of the troops. American spotter planes were used, and American C-47s transported Korean troops and weapons.
American interviews with the population led to a finding that there were 4,000 rebels on the Island (with a population of about 300,000 at the time), but that only 400 had actual arms. The others had swords and farm tools they carried during confrontations.
The rebellion continued but slowed during the summer months. However, in September the provincial administration building was burned down. In October, when Korean Army troops stationed at Yosu were ordered to go to Jeju to suppress rebels, a large number mutinied, and they seized local public buildings. They offered their support to the rebels, but eventually other Army units put down the mutiny. In the meantime, the Jeju rebels were very encouraged by the Yosu actions and they renewed their violence against police and the South Korean Army. By November the government of Syngman Rhee claimed that an additional 1625 rebels had been killed. Many more were imprisoned. By the Spring, the government claimed that the Communist rebels had killed 15,000 civilians and destroyed 3/4th of their villages. A major mop-up action by the South Korean Army put down most of the rebellion during the Spring, when in April, Rhee visited Jeju and asked captured rebels to "forget the past." (New York Times, April 9, 1949).
The rebellion was finally over on August 17, 1949, after the leadership of the movement fell apart following the killing of major rebel leader Yi Tuk-ku.
Rebel prisoners were sent to a camp at Mokpo, fifty miles south of Seoul. In September, 1949, they attempted an escape and 95 were killed. (New York Times, September 16, 1949). Many more were killed by prison guards after the North Koreans invaded South Korea and marched toward the camps. . As the Korean War progressed, Jeju became the site of a prison camp for Chinese Army members. A riot in that prison resulted in 113 prisoners being wounded and 52 being killed. (New York Times, October 2, 1952).
Jeju--Summing Up Numbers and Parties Involved, Reaching for Conclusions
1. The Communist Presence
The many writings I have seen which were published many years after the Jeju massacres seem to present a consensus that the persons in rebellion were not tied to the North Korean government nor to the Soviets, nor were they Communists--with a capital "C". Older writings suggest that there were ties. Articles in the New York Times continuously called the rebels "Communists." (e.g. New York Times, April 23, 1948; April 26, 1948; April 30, 1948; May 2, 1948; June 18, 1948; February 18, 1949). The Times also wrote of both Soviet boats and submarines bringing weapons to the insurgents on the island. (November 22, 1948).
2. Numbers of Rebels
The Times articles confirm that the number of armed rebels was rather small. One article said they were approximately 500 in number. Another article mentioned that of this group 1245 were arrested (evidently some of those with swords or pitchforks were rounded up). The articles also mention the large numbers of civilians killed, but they imply that it was the insurgents who burned the villages and killed the civilians--a contemporary interpretation that has little support today.
Regarding one of the "justifications" for the rebellion, the Times did offer an article which spoke of an assassination of a South Korean General in his bed. The general had been sent to Jeju to coordinate the suppression of the rebels. The article indicated that he had served in the Japanese Army, and was sent to Jeju because he was familiar with the area. (New York Times, June 18, 1948).
3. How Many Civilian Deaths
The estimates of the numbers of civilians killed on Jeju during the 4.3 uprisings range from 10,000 to 80,000. The low number was presented as a "minimum" to a Harvard University Conference. Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson, and Wagner's book, Korea: Old and New, A History (1990) claims that the assault against the rebels "destroyed three fourths of the island's villages and left tens of thousands dead." (p. 339). In Peace Island magazine, Ko and Kim write that 15,000 died. Bruce Cumings reported that the U. S. Army estimated the dead to be between 15,000 and 20,000, while the R.O.K. Army set the number at 27,719 killed. Cumings himself said the range was 30,000 to 60,000, and he mentioned that others said it was as many as 80,000. In 1950 the U.S. estimate was raised to 50,000 .
John Merrill used 60,000 as the number, indicating the death toll represented twenty per cent of the island population, he added that the governor of Jeju believed the number to be 60,000. (Merrill in Matray, The Historical Dictionary of the Korean War, p.80-81; and Merrill, p. 210, n. 3). Lenora Foerstel and Brian Willson said the number was "as many as 70,000" ("United States War Crimes." Center for Research on Globalization, January 26, 2002). Wesley Powell wrote a paper for the Clark Tribunal. He claimed that 80,000 died. ("If it Takes a Lie to Start a War--Only Truth can End It.").
There are no sources that report that no civilians were innocently killed as a result of the Jeju uprisings.
4. Where Should Responsibility For the Jeju Massacres Be Placed?
Merrill writes that "the guerrillas as well as the government forces were often indiscriminate in their use of violence." (p. 81.). He further adds that "the rebellion must stand as testimony to the failure of the occupation to develop viable policies and establish foundations of democracy in Korea....American authorities allowed a reign of right wing terror to develop on the island" (p. 82). "The disproportion between guerrilla and constabulatory losses, as well as the limited number of weapons captured, indicates that the government forces resorted to a tremendous amount of overkill." (p. 123).
Cumings pointed out that under international law from August 15, 1945 to August 15, 1948, the U. S. Army Military Government was the "sole legal authority in " South Korea. Secret agreements gave the U.S. "operational control of the South Korean forces and national police from August 15, 1948 to June 30, 1949." (B. Cumings, Origins of Korean War, v. 1-2, 1981, 1990, Princeton U. Press.) Merrill also writes that "there is still much about the rebellion that remains unclear." (In James L. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War--"Cheju-Do Rebellion," [1991] pp. 80-81)
The validity of this essay relies on information from many sources. I admit that I feel like shying away from some of the information when I sense the kind of "blame America" and "spread the blame to Republicans" posture of Ramsey Clark's tribunal. I also cringe that some of the scenarios I spin out have been repeated in the North Korean press at length. (The People's Korea, June 30, 2001) There are damn few clean hands in the North. They were then, and are more so now "an evil" part of the "evil axis." Nonetheless, the information they--The Clark Tribunal and the North Koreans--cite about Jeju is confirmed in too many other places. There is more than smoke at the scene. There is also fire.
Some of the fires were set by "leftists"--with or without firm connections to "the North" and to the Soviets. Much evidence suggests, however, that the rebellion constituted an indigenous movement that at least began on the island. Many fires had to be set by South Korea and its various forces--police, rightists, the constabulatory, the R.O.K. Army. And some of the fires could have been set by Americans. I cannot believe that there was no fire, no real massacre of civilians, and no American participation--either direct or in command roles (giving orders) or in observing and approving roles.
Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has as much as admitted the veracity of those making claims of a massacre. Following a legislative inquiry--authorized in January 2000, and a subsequent report made on October 15, 2003, he officially apologized on October 31, 2003, stating, "Fifty-five years ago, on the peaceful island of Jeju, one of the most tragic incidents in Korean modern history happened: 4.3. Due to an erroneous decision by the government, many innocent families on Jeju suffered many casualties, endured hardships in their lives, and their homes were destroyed. I give a humble apology for the government's immoral actions of the past. To those people who died innocently, I give remembrance and pray for their souls." The government also decided that a Center for Human Rights and Peace would be established on Jeju. (Ko and Kim).
The President's apology was a SOUTH Korean apology. It is more than likely that the Korean President knows that the victims on Jeju did not suffer only from the rebels or even mostly from the rebels, but rather from the police and the South Korean national army. And those many who suffered included thousands who died, and that's a humiliation a bit more permanent than the humiliation of being disrobed at a prison.
5. And Thousands Escaped from Jeju
I find it incredible that many sources speak of the escape of the civilians of Jeju. Some did go to Pusan (Busan), but it appears from the literature that most escaped to Japan! JAPAN! The largest group went to the Tsurahashi neighborhood in Osaka. Now the Japanese had not been very nice to the Koreans, either in the colonial era or in the sixty years since. They were not allowed to attend good schools or colleges, and they were barred from employment with the major corporations. For a comprehensive list of abuses go to the Osaka Human Rights Museum (Liberty Hall Osaka) and witness the exhibitions as I have done.
Brutalities often accompanied the discrimination against Koreans in Japan. So get the concept. They could stay in Jeju in South Korea under the protection of the armies of Syngman Rhee and the Americans, or they could leave for Japan. Duh! A choice--and many made the choice--to go to Japan. Imagine if the wars of the Intifada became unbearable for Israeli civilians and they had to escape--imagine them going to Germany. Imagine an Armenian suffering discrimination in Iran escaping and going to Turkey. For such journeys to take have taken place, things must have been very bad indeed. Japan had to be "more inviting" than mainland South Korea.
I do not know all the "facts." I am not going to do a mea culpa if I cite one or two sources that are not totally accurate. I have cited sources that disagree with one another. But I know there is enough here for critics of American policy today to be asking questions about the American leaders from the past that they revere and love (ergo, Two Roosevelts, a Wilson, a Truman), at least with their rhetoric (and "presidential polls"). The facts suggest that there is some serious blame to be set on the table.
A flashlight should be shined on these events. On my home campus, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, we have the largest flashlight in the world. It is a 74,000 pound sculpture that stands thirty-eight feet and six inches off the ground. The piece of object art was created and produced by renown artist Claes Oldenburg and his wife Coosje Van Bruggen. It was dedicated in March 1981. The flashlight stands just outside of our performing arts center--Artemus Ham Hall, the Judy Bailey Theater, and the Beam Arts Center. I really like the idea of having the flashlight standing as a symbol of my university--actually of all universities, centers of learning and the production of knowledge as they are .
Light, wisdom, the flash of brilliance, creativity, new discovery. Light, shining the discoveries for all the universe to see, to grasp, ponder, absorb--and use as building blocks. I see a flashlight and I think of Fleming at a fruit stand, Bell making a remark into a box, Edison attaching a tungsten wire to a gadget. Revelation, shared with the world. The only trouble is, that on the UNLV campus, our flashlight is pointed into the ground. When it is turned on each evening, its rays are absorbed by the ground of Las Vegas. It is as if we are saying to the entire universe--we at UNLV shall make discoveries, but the truths we find shall stay in Las Vegas. This is quite fitting actually, as the slogan of the Las Vegas Visitors and Convention Authority has become, "What Happens in Las Vegas, Stays in Las Vegas!" (The absurdity of the slogan is revealed in my essay on William Bennett, HNN, July 21, 2003.)
To tell the truth--which is what universities should be all about--I'd prefer to have our flashlight pointing its rays upward and outward. We should not be espousing a policy of "Don't Ask!"--or "Ask, but Don't Tell," in our ivy'd halls of inquiry. We must expose the events of Jeju, and I know just the man to do so. Not Ramsey Clark, his biased "love thy enemy, and make the blame bipartisan" approach seems too lacking.
The blunders of our foreign intrigues are not partisan blunders, and we can include Republican Theodore Roosevelt in the Jeju scenario. But the Korean blunders of Woodrow Wilson, and Truman--"the Father of the U.N.," and Jimmy Carter, who refused to pressure South Korean leaders to embrace democracy during student uprisings in 1980, while espousing the notion of human rights on the international scene, don't speak very well to the notion that the Democrats have a monopoly on morality in world politics.