An Analysis In Favor Of The U.S. Remaining In Iraq

Iraq lies on a political and economic faultline that the world cannot afford to ignore.

IN THE 1960s Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein was invited to address the Staff College on the principles of strategy. In the middle of the Vietnam war, he opened with the words:"Gentlemen, there are two principles of strategy. The first is 'Never march on Moscow'. The second is 'Never fight a ground war in south-east Asia'." We must now be asking ourselves whether he should not have added a third rule:"Never invade Iraq."

Certainly, the precedents are discouraging. Apart from the difficulties the Ottoman Empire experienced in governing Mesopotamia, governing Iraq, with its national and religious divisions and ancient hatreds, has perplexed heroic leaders from Tamburlaine the Great to Winston Churchill. The old Arab hands in the Foreign Office are not always right, but they warned against the US invasion in terms which have proved prophetic. It is arguable that the policy of containing rather than removing the Saddam Hussein regime would have been more realistic.

At the time, I took the Government's view, and supported the Prime Minister's decision to back President Bush. The initial invasion was rapidly successful; at that point, the decision to cut out the Saddam cancer seemed justified. There was, however, a gross failure to plan for the aftermath of the war. No doubt the Americans bear the main responsibility for that, but Tony Blair shares the blame..

The alternative policy of continuing containment was not attractive. It depended on the unity of the major powers but the European powers, including France and Russia, were dealing with Saddam and undermining the policy. Saddam himself had been responsible for millions of deaths. No Iraqi was safe. The neighbouring countries felt that he was a permanent threat to their security.

From the British Government's point of view, refusal to support the United States would have been a breach of the Anglo-American alliance. The Americans would anyway have gone ahead without us. Even with the benefit of hindsight, the arguments for Mr Blair's policy remain strong, though he should have had a better understanding of the risks. That might have led to a better postwar plan -the biggest failure -and to greater frankness in arguing the case for war. In my judgment, Tony Blair did not lie, but neither did he tell the whole truth.

Beside these arguments there is the question of oil. This appears on placards as though the world's governments ought not to concern themselves about the world's supply of energy. That is impossible. All the major global economic equations include oil, whether one is talking about the development of China, the US deficit, the level of interest rates, the prospect for inflation, the level of unemployment or the survival of the European Union itself, with its expensive welfare systems. In the 1970s, almost every democratic government in the world was turned out of office by a global inflation based on the oil market.