What If America Had Elected Walter Mondale in 1984?

The current Bush-Kerry debate about the realism of the U.S. led effort to remake the Middle East which is the real goal of the Iraq war reminds me of the 1984 Reagan-Mondale one. This is so because then as now the elections came at a pivotal moment when the price of the American rekindling of Cold War as the price of the war on terror was clear to all but the payoff was not. In other words, what if Mondale had won the 1984 election?

The short answer seems to be that the Cold War with its accompanying fear of a nuclear winter would probably have still been with us. Why? Because Mondale and his experts, like Kerry and his advisors, assumed that the most advantageous policy the U.S. could pursue would be one which would lead us “back” then to the pre-Reagan years; now to the pre-9/11 ones. Those good old days, when Mutual Assured Destruction or terrorism were an accepted part of our existence, a mere “nuisance” rather than the frightening “central focus of our lives.” Experts, especially in Western Europe, considered Reagan’s advocacy of relegating the Soviet Union to the ash heap of history then like Bush’s insistence on defeating Islamism now as an unrealistic goal advocated by a dim-witted cowboy .Indeed, even talking about “evil empire” then--like “evil terrorists” now--not only made the American people more anxious but also less secure by arousing opponents and undermining alliances. These were the arguments forwarded in a number of articles published in the 1984 summer and fall issues of Foreign Affairs, the premier outlet of the American foreign policy establishment.

We cannot change the Soviet system, seriously damage their economy, alter their attitude toward human rights, weaken their hold on Eastern Europe, Mongolia, Afghanistan, or indeed change the rough balance between the Untied States and the U.S.S.R. There is no hope of convergence of the two systems, nor of enmeshing the Soviets in a web of self interests.

But there is hope that a new generation, if accepted as political equals by the West and above all by the United States, if convinced that the aim of the latter is cohabitation rather than destruction of the Soviet system, and increasingly preoccupied by their enormous social and economic problems, will be prepared to return to a more reasonable relationship with the West. They will not make it easy to do so, and an almost excessive amount of patience will be required. But I think it can be done.

Thus ended in the summer 1984 issue of the magazine the article, “The Soviet Union: The Next Decade,” by Robert A.D. Ford, a Canadian who served for more than twenty years as a diplomat in the Soviet Union. Startlingly, Robert Ford’s essentially defeatist conclusions were no more based on a positive evaluation of the Soviet state than today’s expert evaluations of the state of the Arab world or on their pacific intentions. On the contrary, Ford correctly noted the economic and ideological difficulties of the U.S.S.R. and its new leaders’ understanding that without serious reforms the Communist Party would be unable to meet even the “reasonable expectations of the population of an improvement in the standard of living at least comparable to that of the despised Poles or Czechs.” Apparently, Ford’s discussion with the emerging Soviet leadership led him to write the following:

The new leaders are too intelligent and informed to have any illusion about bridging the technological gulf between the U.S.S.R. and the West and Japan or of doing much more than holding their own in the arms race. At the same time the specter of a more stable China gradually modernizing its economy with the U.S. and Japanese help will be a continuing nightmare. Finally, they must face the problems created by the failure of their ideology: the near collapse of the Communist Party in Poland and the need to ensure its de facto rule by a military dictatorship on the other hand, and their inability to make the bulk of the Afghan population accept communism on the other. The West pays little attention to this phenomenon, but it is an important fact in Soviet calculation.

So why was the Reagan attempt to exploit the Soviet difficulties by involving them in a new arms race, challenging their ideology and aiding their Polish and Afghani enemies not the way to go? Because, argued Ford, “it is not very difficult in the Soviet Union’s authoritarian society to rally the ruling class, and indeed the bulk of the population around the leadership in a 'fortress Russia' mentality.” Moreover, any additional pressure on their system would merely reinforce “the feeling that they as Russians are being isolated and humiliated, and as a superpower, ignored.” Hence, the Soviet leadership, elite and people, argued Ford, would be prepared “to pay any price” needed to defend their system just as today Middle Eastern experts warn us that Middle Eastern leaders, elites and people would be willing to pay any price to prevent a Western-led democratization of their system. This, of course, ignores the three million refugees who returned to Afghanistan and participated with great pride in its first elections.

In his article “The Nuclear Debate” published in the fall 1984 issue of the magazine, Robert W. Tucker seconded Ford’s assumption that past Soviet behavior is an accurate predictor of its future behavior: “There is no apparent reason to conclude that on this occasion the Soviet Union would prove unable to do what it has done regularly in the past. Having sacrificed so much to reach its present position of strategic eminence, it may be expected to remain willing to make the necessary effort and sacrifice to keep this position.” Hence, he argued, the Reagan administration’s attempt to regain the lost strategic advantage has made the prospect of nuclear war once again seem close and real. The increased public anxiety caused by such a prospect may lead to the ultimate loss of the Cold War by subjecting “our principle alliance to new and serious strain” and giving rise to an anti-nuclear movement which is convincing Americans that nuclear weapons are “illegitimate.” The argument parallels the one currently forwarded by Kerry and his advisors to the effect that the Iraq war made us less safe by undermining our alliances and giving rise to Anti-Americanism abroad and divisions at home.

“Derided earlier in this century,” Tucker writes, “the view that liberal-capitalist societies are inherently pacific--and even pacifist--is one that can no longer be readily dismissed.” In other words, free societies are “softer” than totalitarian ones. This conclusion was followed and seconded by an article entitled, “The Public Mood,” written by Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble. These two experts reported their finding on the mood of the electorate thus:

The Public agenda survey shows two-thirds of the public (67%) endores the view that the “Soviet Union used détente as an opportunity to build up their armed forces while lulling us into a sense of fall security.

In the 1980 and 1981 the backlash against détente reached a high peak of intensity. The public mood was characterized by injured national pride, unqualified support for increasing the defense budget, and a general desire to see American power become more assertive.

The public is now having second thoughts about the dangers of such an assertive posture at a time when the United States is no longer seen to maintain nuclear supremacy. The electorate is still wary, mistrustful, and still convinced that the Soviets will seize every possible advantage they can; yet, at the same time, Americans are determined to stop what they see as a drift towards nuclear confrontation which, in the electorate’s view, neither we not the Soviet desire. The stage is being set for a new phase in our relationship with the Soviets.

It was those second thoughts that Mondale and his advisors wished to encourage then and Kerry and his advisors wish to encourage now. If the direction of that new phase of superpower relations depended on the outcome of the 1984 elections, the direction of American relations with the Muslim world depend on the outcome of the 2004 elections. By reelecting Reagan, the American people proved that they were willing to pay the price needed to achieve victory and in so doing they enhanced immensely President Reagan’s bargaining power. Consequently, when Reagan refused to negotiate away the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviet leadership, elite and people confounded the experts and decided not to make the sacrifices needed to keep up with the Americans in yet another costly arms race.

Similarly, a Bush victory coming as it will in the wake of the Howard victory in Australia is bound to send a powerful message not only to the Islamists but also to our real and nominal Muslim allies that they better join the anti-Islamist fight and take the American demand for reform seriously. A Bush defeat is bound to send the opposite signal. Even if Kerry would like to prosecute the war on terror in Iraq and elsewhere, he would have to overcome the worldwide perception that the electorate has repudiated not only Bush but his forceful policy. In other words, much of the hard work and sacrifices made by the American people in the past three years would be wasted. This may not be fair, but it is nonetheless true and I suspect the American people know it.