Not Even Lincoln During the Civil War Had a "Stop-Loss" Policy
John Robertson, in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (12-19-04):
The Bush administration has decided that the Iraq war will not have its own Ben Falls.
Falls is the soldier most often mentioned by historians as the exemplar of the heroic self-sacrifice exhibited by Union soldiers in the American Civil War. Look in almost any history of that war and you will hear how when the re-enlistment push came in December 1863, only 25 of the original 100 men remained in company A of the 19th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry. Despite that high attrition rate, its color sergeant said laconically, "Well, if new men won't finish the job, old men must, and as long as Uncle Sam wants a man, here is Ben Falls."
Here is the type of soldier a country can use to build a democratic army. Patriotism induced him to enlist even though he had a wife and two children and he re-enlisted even though he was 39 years old and his Medal of Honor suggested he had already done his part. His death at Spotsylvania in the spring of 1864 gives the tale heroic grandeur.
The Bush administration has replaced voluntary self-sacrifice with a "stop loss" policy of forced continued service. Now some soldiers are suing the army for permission to return home at the end of their term of service. The army is saying no, based on what it cites as necessity and precedence. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claims "stop loss" is a "very, very old policy" and justifies it by referring to its use in the first Gulf war to prevent problems identified in Vietnam. The Vietnam problem was a perceived loss of unit cohesion when the army allowed soldiers to return stateside at the end of their tour of duty.
Like many lessons from a lost war, these are questionable assumptions.
In the first place, unit cohesion, while somewhat important, is a dated concept for modern warfare. More important, while there may be a precedence of using "stop loss" in the first Gulf war, that war was too short to test its legality or effectiveness.
I suggest looking for guidance on this issue to an earlier, larger and longer war that actually threatened the existence of the United States.
The spring of 1863 has some similarities to the winter of 2004. Both found the country mired in a war that was clearly lasting longer than prewar projections (there were also unanticipated problems with occupying captured territory and how to restore democratic institutions, but that is an analogy for another day). There was concern for what would happen when the soldiers' enlistment terms ended if they chose to return home.
In Iraq the unilateral action of the government means that we do not know how the soldiers would have reacted if given the choice to extend or end their tour of duty. The Abraham Lincoln administration had some idea what might happen since 38 of 40 two-year regiments chose to muster out in May 1863. In the next year, over 500 three-year regiments enlistment terms would end and if the re-enlistment rate was as low there would not be enough soldiers to continue offensive campaigning in 1864.
The Lincoln administration did not enact its own "stop loss" program because of a legal precedent that the Bush administration should also consider.
The 1st Minnesota Regiment filed suit against the state of Minnesota in 1861, demanding release from their service obligations since the government had failed in its responsibility of providing them with competent leadership.
The Supreme Court did not comment on their objections to their officers while rejecting their request ruling that the enlistment term was a contract that neither side had the right to break. The government thus had the power to coerce a man to serve the full term of his enlistment -- but could not force him to serve another day past its end.
The Lincoln administration defied the Supreme Court on some issues but chose to respect the court's verdict in this case. Instead, the government launched a big campaign to encourage soldiers to re-enlist. The key components to the incentive package were a month-long furlough and a bonus equivalent to over two years pay for a laborer.
The re-enlistment campaign was successful in getting over half of the soldiers to sign on for three more years. By the spring of 1864, 136,000 of the three-year veterans re-enlisted and 100,000 mustered out. The Union army was successful in its 1864 campaigns thanks to the men who re-enlisted and those who mustered out but continued to fight every day until the end of their term of service.
The Bush administration has decided that the Iraq war will not have its own Ben Falls.
Falls is the soldier most often mentioned by historians as the exemplar of the heroic self-sacrifice exhibited by Union soldiers in the American Civil War. Look in almost any history of that war and you will hear how when the re-enlistment push came in December 1863, only 25 of the original 100 men remained in company A of the 19th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry. Despite that high attrition rate, its color sergeant said laconically, "Well, if new men won't finish the job, old men must, and as long as Uncle Sam wants a man, here is Ben Falls."
Here is the type of soldier a country can use to build a democratic army. Patriotism induced him to enlist even though he had a wife and two children and he re-enlisted even though he was 39 years old and his Medal of Honor suggested he had already done his part. His death at Spotsylvania in the spring of 1864 gives the tale heroic grandeur.
The Bush administration has replaced voluntary self-sacrifice with a "stop loss" policy of forced continued service. Now some soldiers are suing the army for permission to return home at the end of their term of service. The army is saying no, based on what it cites as necessity and precedence. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claims "stop loss" is a "very, very old policy" and justifies it by referring to its use in the first Gulf war to prevent problems identified in Vietnam. The Vietnam problem was a perceived loss of unit cohesion when the army allowed soldiers to return stateside at the end of their tour of duty.
Like many lessons from a lost war, these are questionable assumptions.
In the first place, unit cohesion, while somewhat important, is a dated concept for modern warfare. More important, while there may be a precedence of using "stop loss" in the first Gulf war, that war was too short to test its legality or effectiveness.
I suggest looking for guidance on this issue to an earlier, larger and longer war that actually threatened the existence of the United States.
The spring of 1863 has some similarities to the winter of 2004. Both found the country mired in a war that was clearly lasting longer than prewar projections (there were also unanticipated problems with occupying captured territory and how to restore democratic institutions, but that is an analogy for another day). There was concern for what would happen when the soldiers' enlistment terms ended if they chose to return home.
In Iraq the unilateral action of the government means that we do not know how the soldiers would have reacted if given the choice to extend or end their tour of duty. The Abraham Lincoln administration had some idea what might happen since 38 of 40 two-year regiments chose to muster out in May 1863. In the next year, over 500 three-year regiments enlistment terms would end and if the re-enlistment rate was as low there would not be enough soldiers to continue offensive campaigning in 1864.
The Lincoln administration did not enact its own "stop loss" program because of a legal precedent that the Bush administration should also consider.
The 1st Minnesota Regiment filed suit against the state of Minnesota in 1861, demanding release from their service obligations since the government had failed in its responsibility of providing them with competent leadership.
The Supreme Court did not comment on their objections to their officers while rejecting their request ruling that the enlistment term was a contract that neither side had the right to break. The government thus had the power to coerce a man to serve the full term of his enlistment -- but could not force him to serve another day past its end.
The Lincoln administration defied the Supreme Court on some issues but chose to respect the court's verdict in this case. Instead, the government launched a big campaign to encourage soldiers to re-enlist. The key components to the incentive package were a month-long furlough and a bonus equivalent to over two years pay for a laborer.
The re-enlistment campaign was successful in getting over half of the soldiers to sign on for three more years. By the spring of 1864, 136,000 of the three-year veterans re-enlisted and 100,000 mustered out. The Union army was successful in its 1864 campaigns thanks to the men who re-enlisted and those who mustered out but continued to fight every day until the end of their term of service.