Upcoming British Election Compared To Those Of Recent Past
Peter Riddell, The Times (London), 1/06/05
At some stage over the next two or three years the direction of British politics will change. Tony Blair will leave 10 Downing Street and Labour's 12-year dominance will begin to end. But the turning point is highly unlikely to occur in May. The general election will matter for the careers of politicians, yet the familiar political landscape may be largely unchanged. Few elections are decisive in this way.
Sir Lewis Namier, the great historian of 18th-century parliaments, described elections as locks on the river of British history, controlling the flow of events. David Butler, the leading authority on elections for the past 50 years, has noted how elections (1945, 1964, 1979 and 1997) have replaced the dates of monarchs' reigns as historians' landmarks.
Yet in many respects this is a gross oversimplification. As Dr Butler has himself argued:"Elections may decide less than they appear to, certainly less than is suggested in the rhetoric of campaign speeches." None of the major postwar landmarks was associated with an election: the formation of Nato, the Suez invasion in 1956, decolonisation, entry into the European Community and the International Monetary Fund crisis of 1976.
Economic and foreign policies have normally changed in response to circumstances and a lengthy reassessment by policymakers. This is what Alan Milward, the historian, has called national strategy, a line of policy pursued over many years, irrespective of party, by ministers and civil servants.
Professor Milward was writing about European policy 1945-60 when Labour and the Tories pursued a similar approach of a close alliance with the US, maintaining the Commonwealth and pursuing an open, global trading system. It was only after Suez and after the European Community became established, that there was a change. From the mid-1960s onwards European entry became national strategy.
The abandonment of Keynesian economic policy and its replacement by what became known as monetarism occurred in 1975-76. This was nothing to do with elections but followed the surge in inflation and public spending of the previous two years. The agreement with the IMF in December 1976 publicly confirmed a shift in monetary and fiscal policy already under way within the Treasury.
So the foundations for much of the economic side of Thatcherism were laid before the Tory victory in May 1979. Of course, Margaret Thatcher's victory made a big difference, notably in the battles with the trade unions and over privatisation, but the direction of economic stratgegy had begun to change earlier.
A decade later, the decisive change in monetary policy occurred after Black Wednesday in September 1992. This led to the focus on inflation targets and a more open system of setting interest rates. Gordon Brown is rightly praised for his bold move in May 1997 to make the Bank of England independent, which has been crucial for creating economic stability. But Mr Brown was building on this earlier shift in policy.
Similarly, many of Labour's public service reforms can be traced back to the Major government. City academies, which are likely to be increased substantially if Labour wins again, are very similar to the Tories' city technology colleges, and primary care trusts are a variant of pre-1997 GP fundholding. During its first term Labour abandoned many Tory reforms, only to revive them during its second term. Whoever wins in May, the quasi-market approach of greater consumer choice and diversity of provision will continue. Of course, the Tories would go much farther, but the broad direction would be similar.
The main significance of the election is likely to be in affecting the terms of Mr Blair's remaining period as Prime Minister. How will a much reduced Labour majority affect his freedom of manoeuvre?
The decisive events are likely to be further ahead. Mr Blair has said that he wants to serve a full third term, but not seek a fourth. This implies another three years or so in office at most. But all this could be changed by the referendum on the European constitution expected in the spring next year. This will be very hard to win unless its supporters can successfully argue both that the EU constitution does not fundamentally alter the terms of Britain's membership and that a"no" vote would leave Britain isolated.
The referendum offers the public a chance to vote against Mr Blair without defeating Labour. If the vote were lost, he would be under great pressure to go.
By contrast, a"no" vote would boost Tory morale. Yet it could also encourage hardline Tory sceptics who want a fundamental renegotiation of Britain's membership, and even withdrawal. Perversely, a"yes" vote, which sceptics would see as a betrayal of British sovereignty, might fuel similar anti-EU demands.
However, it could allow Mr Blair to leave on his own terms, and settle the European question for at least the rest of this decade.
The stakes will be very high, which is one reason why so many Blairites remain puzzled, and privately angry, about why he promised a referendum last April. Not only would defeat shatter his European hopes, but the longstanding national strategy of closer British involvement in the EU would have been undermined. After all, securing a"yes" vote is one of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's strategic priorities.
The referendum could be one of those turning points in British politics. The May general election, fascinating though it will be, will be more like a preliminary skirmish.
At some stage over the next two or three years the direction of British politics will change. Tony Blair will leave 10 Downing Street and Labour's 12-year dominance will begin to end. But the turning point is highly unlikely to occur in May. The general election will matter for the careers of politicians, yet the familiar political landscape may be largely unchanged. Few elections are decisive in this way.
Sir Lewis Namier, the great historian of 18th-century parliaments, described elections as locks on the river of British history, controlling the flow of events. David Butler, the leading authority on elections for the past 50 years, has noted how elections (1945, 1964, 1979 and 1997) have replaced the dates of monarchs' reigns as historians' landmarks.
Yet in many respects this is a gross oversimplification. As Dr Butler has himself argued:"Elections may decide less than they appear to, certainly less than is suggested in the rhetoric of campaign speeches." None of the major postwar landmarks was associated with an election: the formation of Nato, the Suez invasion in 1956, decolonisation, entry into the European Community and the International Monetary Fund crisis of 1976.
Economic and foreign policies have normally changed in response to circumstances and a lengthy reassessment by policymakers. This is what Alan Milward, the historian, has called national strategy, a line of policy pursued over many years, irrespective of party, by ministers and civil servants.
Professor Milward was writing about European policy 1945-60 when Labour and the Tories pursued a similar approach of a close alliance with the US, maintaining the Commonwealth and pursuing an open, global trading system. It was only after Suez and after the European Community became established, that there was a change. From the mid-1960s onwards European entry became national strategy.
The abandonment of Keynesian economic policy and its replacement by what became known as monetarism occurred in 1975-76. This was nothing to do with elections but followed the surge in inflation and public spending of the previous two years. The agreement with the IMF in December 1976 publicly confirmed a shift in monetary and fiscal policy already under way within the Treasury.
So the foundations for much of the economic side of Thatcherism were laid before the Tory victory in May 1979. Of course, Margaret Thatcher's victory made a big difference, notably in the battles with the trade unions and over privatisation, but the direction of economic stratgegy had begun to change earlier.
A decade later, the decisive change in monetary policy occurred after Black Wednesday in September 1992. This led to the focus on inflation targets and a more open system of setting interest rates. Gordon Brown is rightly praised for his bold move in May 1997 to make the Bank of England independent, which has been crucial for creating economic stability. But Mr Brown was building on this earlier shift in policy.
Similarly, many of Labour's public service reforms can be traced back to the Major government. City academies, which are likely to be increased substantially if Labour wins again, are very similar to the Tories' city technology colleges, and primary care trusts are a variant of pre-1997 GP fundholding. During its first term Labour abandoned many Tory reforms, only to revive them during its second term. Whoever wins in May, the quasi-market approach of greater consumer choice and diversity of provision will continue. Of course, the Tories would go much farther, but the broad direction would be similar.
The main significance of the election is likely to be in affecting the terms of Mr Blair's remaining period as Prime Minister. How will a much reduced Labour majority affect his freedom of manoeuvre?
The decisive events are likely to be further ahead. Mr Blair has said that he wants to serve a full third term, but not seek a fourth. This implies another three years or so in office at most. But all this could be changed by the referendum on the European constitution expected in the spring next year. This will be very hard to win unless its supporters can successfully argue both that the EU constitution does not fundamentally alter the terms of Britain's membership and that a"no" vote would leave Britain isolated.
The referendum offers the public a chance to vote against Mr Blair without defeating Labour. If the vote were lost, he would be under great pressure to go.
By contrast, a"no" vote would boost Tory morale. Yet it could also encourage hardline Tory sceptics who want a fundamental renegotiation of Britain's membership, and even withdrawal. Perversely, a"yes" vote, which sceptics would see as a betrayal of British sovereignty, might fuel similar anti-EU demands.
However, it could allow Mr Blair to leave on his own terms, and settle the European question for at least the rest of this decade.
The stakes will be very high, which is one reason why so many Blairites remain puzzled, and privately angry, about why he promised a referendum last April. Not only would defeat shatter his European hopes, but the longstanding national strategy of closer British involvement in the EU would have been undermined. After all, securing a"yes" vote is one of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's strategic priorities.
The referendum could be one of those turning points in British politics. The May general election, fascinating though it will be, will be more like a preliminary skirmish.