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Your Argument Just Tripped on a Rock and Shot Itself in the Foot With a Rusty Musket
by Cliopatria
At the Huffington Post today, UCLA law professor Adam Winkler proves that the framers would have supported a congressional mandate for every American to buy health insurance from private corporations. After all, the framers did something just like it:
That Congress lacks the power to require people to buy a product when the national interest demands it would surprise the Founding Fathers. They required people to do just that. In the second Militia Act of 1792, they required individuals to outfit themselves with a military-style firearm and ammunition. This was the first 'individual mandate' and one had to obey even if one had to go out and buy a gun. Being passive didn't put you out of Congress's reach.
Okay: that's sort of almost true, if you stop with a single clause of the law, carefully shield yourself from notice of later militia laws, and avoid noticing anything that any actual human beings ever did in reality.
Let's start with a single brief story to suggest a very broad national pattern:
In September of 1814, a brigade of Connecticut militia met for review and inspection. The officer assigned to conduct the inspection, Major Ralph Ingersoll, would find himself in front of a court martial a few months later, accused by three other officers of unofficerlike behavior and neglect of duty. The foundation of the charges was that Ingersoll had been"unnecessarily rigid + severe in the inspection of the arms."
Simple translation: Ingersoll had offended his fellow officers by actually inspecting the brigade.
In his written defense statement, Ingersoll noted that much of the state's militia had melted away in the face of invading British forces, a painful reality that reflected a nationwide problem. The country was essentially unprepared to fight a war that it had already been fighting for two years.
In Connecticut, Ingersoll told the court, militiamen"absolutely flung aside the very muskets, which had freed their heads from taxation, as unfit for service; + called upon the state, to furnish them with arms -- Yes Sir, arms which the soldiers would have cursed their officers, for condemning on a parade ground, were in numbers of instances, by the same soldiers, abandoned as useless, when called to encounter the realities of service."
Militia records from the decades after 1792 return to this reality over and over and over again: the requirement that every militiaman be armed with an adequate weapon and equipment never led to an earthly reality in which every militiaman was armed with an adequate weapon and equipment. The open secret of the era was that the Militia Act's requirements had the substance of dissipating steam. Government said that everybody had to do it. But nobody much did it.
This is, by the way, not a return to Michael Bellesiles' argument. Militiamen were armed, but not necessarily with weapons they wanted to bet their lives on. This was a distinction that led to constant anger and argument between militia privates and militia officers (and to officers who gave up, and so found themselves horrified by fellow officers like Ingersoll who actually bothered to keep trying). A requirement that everyone of a certain class do X led to endless conflict over the boundaries of X -- to forty years of sneaking and cheating and evasion. This power was contested until it broke.
By 1826, Secretary of War James Barbour would ask a board of officers,"aided by the results of a correspondence with the governors of the several States and Territories and other citizens of intelligence and experience," to examine"the acknowledged defective condition of our militia system." (That description comes from President John Quincy Adams.)
The universal militia, founded upon the idea that much of the white male population of fighting age would be compelled to reliably arm itself, was dead. It was replaced by a militia system based on volunteers.
So, yes: Congress required that every member of a particular group buy a particular product. Every member of that group did not buy the product. The policy failed, entirely and unmistakably. It didn't come close to working. This is clearly a solid foundation for rational health care policy.
And by the way, the"first 'individual mandate'" that required everyone to buy a gun? It didn't. It required white men between the ages of 18 and 45 to be armed, exempting only"the Vice-President of the United States, the Officers, judicial and executives, of the government of the United States; the members of both houses of Congress, and their respective officers; all custom house officers, with the clerks; all post officers, and stage-drivers who are employed in the care and conveyance of the mail of the post office of the United States; all Ferrymen employed at any ferry on the post road; all inspectors of exports; all pilots, all mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States; and all persons who now are or may be hereafter exempted by the laws of the respective states."
So a sort of slightly weak universal mandate, that one.
Well, as I keep having to point out, I am not a Colonial/ Early American expert, but I do know something about England at the same period.
The basic unit of local government was the parish, or the town of one parish, which usually came to the same thing. "Health, Education, and Welfare" issues were handled at this level. The customary arrangements came from England, and were still substantially the same. There was not very much travel in the first place, on account of its obvious difficulty, and obviously vulnerable people, such as the very old, pregnant women, etc., traveled still less. There was the notion of "settlement," something like citizenship on the local level. You possessed a settlement in a parish, generally by virtue of being born there, or apprenticed there, or married there. Settlement meant that the parish had to maintain you when you became an economic liability. If you did not have settlement, and you became unable to work, you got deported back to the place you had come from. You know, like Mexican immigrants.
There is a literature of New England small towns. I myself know a very small portion of it. I suppose a starting point would be: Michael Zuckerman, _Peaceable Kingdoms: New England Towns in the Eighteenth Century_ (1970). One might also look at Carl Bridenbaugh's _Cities In Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776_ (1955, 1970). Bear in mind that these cities were all very small, Philadelphia being the largest at 50,000 people. A natural leader like Benjamin Franklin could always go and talk the local Scrooge around if he had to.
In an essentially agricultural society, sailors were an anomaly, because they were rootless men who didn't belong anywhere. They would have been called outright vagabonds except for the fact that when they came ashore, they normally had money to splash around, having just been paid off. When they had spent their money, they would normally go around the ships, looking for berths. Read Herman Melville, and Richard Henry Dana. It was perfectly normal for a sailor to arrive at Boston, having shipped out of Charleston, South Carolina, several years previously, and having been to Africa and China in the meantime. That was the sailor's way. He hired on by the voyage. If sailors should get sick on shore, or be put ashore sick, with no wages, then no captain would want to take them away again. The founding fathers were forced to invent something like a modern welfare system to deal with sailors.
Chris Bray -
2/2/2011
You've thought about the politics of the matter as carefully as you've thought about the rest of your argument. The individual mandate is a gift to private corporations. It's grotesquely illiberal, in form and in effect -- but somehow opposition to it is labeled as a right-wing position that can be compared to paranoia about fluoridation. This is marketing, not argument.
You're reinforcing my growing sense that there's little to no ideological content to contemporary political differences, which now mostly function as a means of signaling class identity and social status.
David Silbey -
2/2/2011
I assume that will come in between Hartford Conventions for the income tax, Social Security, fluoridation, and the age-21 drinking limit.
Chris Bray -
2/2/2011
I'm not sure what premise you mean to establish, here, and I invite you to make it explicit. Adam Winkler argues that a comparison between a current law and a past law suggests that the current law will survive constitutional review. I argue that Winkler's comparison is underexamined: if we accept the comparison and examine it broadly, it suggests the likelihood of a policy failure.
Do you mean to argue here that my approach cannot be appropriate or legitimate? Is it your intent to say that I must be bound by the limits of Winkler's analysis, and that it's somehow improper or inapposite to examine his comparison more broadly than he does?
Beyond that, I would welcome you to explicitly work through Winkler's post and suggest what you find impressive in it. Do you think he's argued his point well? Why?
Ralph M. Hitchens -
2/2/2011
I think Sibley made a valid point, & it's in the hands of the judiciary for applicability. Another precedent noted recently involved the early republic mandating mariner's health insurance, to be paid for by shipping companies. (Don't have the cite, but it's out there somewhere on the Internet.)
Chris Bray -
2/2/2011
As a political matter, btw, I agree with the presidential candidate who said that an individual mandate would make things worse: “If a mandate was the solution, we could try that to solve homelessness by mandating everybody buy a house."
A shame we didn't elect that guy.
Chris Bray -
2/2/2011
I am happy to concede that he may be correct, and the individual mandate that makes the federal government the armed marketing operation for United Healthcare may survive constitutional review. In that case, I look forward to filling out the rest of the comparison, and I hope to be a delegate at our Hartford Convention.
David Silbey -
2/2/2011
No, I'm maintaining the quite tenable position that you are rebutting Winkler with something that is irrelevant to his point.
Chris Bray -
2/2/2011
You're maintaining the untenable posture that Winkler was describing the individual mandate in a detached and scholarly way. He is an advocate for the thing.
David Silbey -
2/2/2011
"You most certainly do, if you're advocating using it as a model."
No, you don't, if you're using it as an example of a surprise attack.
Chris Bray -
2/2/2011
You most certainly do, if you're advocating using it as a model.
David Silbey -
2/2/2011
you have to mention that Y was a disaster as enacted policy
You don't have to point out that Pearl Harbor didn't turn out well for the Japanese when discussing whether it was a surprise attack or not.
Chris Bray -
2/2/2011
Also see my discussion with Willian Harshaw below -- Winkler is relying on the Interstate Commerce Clause, but the Militia Act was undertaken under different and very specific authority.
Beyond that, though, this is one of those arguments that might work narrowly, but demolishes itself if it's intended to serve the purpose of arguing for a policy -- which is what Winkler intends. (He doesn't present himself as someone who is arguing for the constitutionality of a measure that he opposes as a matter of policy.) You can't believe that Winkler meant his comparison to prove that the individual mandate is 1.) constitutionally valid and 2.) destined to be a miserable, unenforceable failure of policy.
In any case, if you're going to argue that X is constitutionally valid because it's like Y and Y was constitutionally valid, you have to mention that Y was a disaster as enacted policy. Otherwise, what good is the argument? This useless pile of untenable garbage will survive constitutional review is an odd thing to wheel out in public in support of something you favor.
David Silbey -
2/2/2011
Winkler is naturally speaking like a lawyer, as the question being asked about the mandate ("is it constitutional?") is, in essence, lawyerly. That the precedent he cites was not implemented well still doesn't speak to that question. In the end, Winkler might agree with everything you've said and still find his argument unaffected. I wouldn't disagree with him.
Chris Bray -
2/1/2011
I thank you again for getting me to think about this, because here's another problem with the comparison: the federal government did not fine militiamen for failure to arm themselves. The system of fines and inspections was a federal mandate passed down to the states to be defined and enforced at the state level.
Militiamen who were fined for being improperly equipped were brought before local justices of the peace, and the charges against them were heard under state law. So the comparison fails in another way that I hadn't thought of right away.
Chris Bray -
2/1/2011
A very important point, and one I'm sorry to have missed. This source of constitutional authority is a problem for Winkler's argument, and thanks for pointing it out.
William Harshaw -
2/1/2011
I take your point about the policy being ineffective as implemented. I'd also observe that, if Congress in 1792 had observed the Republicans new rule about citing their authority under the Constitution for the legislation, they would undoubtedly have cited their authority under Article I, Section 8, to provide for the arming and disciplining of the militia, not the Commerce clause.
Chris Bray -
2/1/2011
Also, by the way, I stopped myself, because I wanted to write a five million-word blog post about this, but there was an extraordinarily vigorous debate in the early republic about the Constitution and the place of the militia. If the United States had still been at war late into 1815, we don't know what the political effects would have been. But the Hartford Convention had already proposed to radically amend the Constitution, and they did it over the federal government's proposal of a militia draft. That's one of many urgent arguments about the limits of militia requirements in the decades after 1792.
So Winkler presents this picture in which universal mandates are unobjectionable, because they had those back in the old days, and nobody complained. But everybody complained. He finds an uncomplicated past to relieve a present policy of contention, but he's scraping off the edges of the past.
Chris Bray -
2/1/2011
My point is not that it's constitutional or unconstitutional, a question that has divided judges and lawyers with far more experience in the law than I'll ever have. My point is that it's not possible to claim the Militia Act of 1792 as a functioning precedent. He's doing history like a lawyer, examining statutory text but not the utility, effects, or survival of the statute. If the thing he argues for works as well as the thing he compares it to, the example he chooses is not a useful comparison to him.
It's constitutionally valid for me to eat gravel! My neighbor did it, and nobody raised constitutional issues when he did it! You still shouldn't eat gravel.
Also, if you read Winkler's piece, I think it's pretty clear that he doesn't present a developed argument about the constitutionality of the individual mandate; rather, he presents a series of gestures and reflexes. He doesn't substantially engage the text of the judge's decision invalidating the law, doesn't argue (through an examination of the judge's career, for example) for his claim that the judge is a right-wing activist, doesn't argue for the claim that the invalidation of the law was undertaken by a politicized court. He just says it, as if saying it makes the case.
David Silbey -
2/1/2011
I'm not sure I see the connection between a policy not working and it not being constitutional. Winkler's argument is that the mandate is constitutional and here is a similar previous law. That the law did not work may suggest that the individual mandate won't work, but the failure doesn't suggest anything about the mandate's constitutionality.
Chris Bray -
2/1/2011
I invite you to explain what makes this a "right-wing essay." Do you challenge any fact claims that I've made here? Do you challenge my interpretation of the militia mandate and its outcome?
Labeling is so much easier than thinking, I guess.
Ralph E. Luker -
2/1/2011
You might direct that question specifically to the self described "left wingers" who are members of this group blog. Aaron Bady, Scott McLemee and Claire Potter come to mind.
Karen Lofstrom -
2/1/2011
If you don't think that people should be forced to buy health insurance from predatory private companies, then give me a public option. Just like Canada or France. OK?
Why does this blog post right-wing essays but no left-wing essays?