Obama's Syria Shift Sends Foreign Policy Elite Back to School
tags: Chernus,foreign policy elite
In my last post, I
suggested that the American public, far from being "isolationist,"
still generally accepts the vision that Franklin D. Roosevelt used to defeat
the "isolationists," the same vision he later offered for world
peace: the U.S. enforcing global order without risking American blood. Now
Barack Obama has stepped back from the brink of "boots on the ground"
in Syria and returned to FDR's idealized approach to policing the world.
Obama also took another page from FDR's book: Compromise, be
flexible, and cooperate with the Russians when that's the best way to avoid
risking American lives. In this case, Obama is cooperating with the Russians to
deactivate the Syrian government's chemical weapons stockpile. As we
now know, the president began exploring that
idea with Vladimir Putin back in June. They both liked the idea enough that
their technical people have already spent months figuring out how to do it. And
the American people like the idea enough that an astounding
82% favor the U.S. - Russian plan.
The foreign policy elite, still living in the world created
by Harry Truman's cold warriors, are horrified by the very idea of Obama
trading toughness for conciliation. In their world, flexibility is weakness,
and only the strong survive.
Which just shows what a gap there is between the elite and the
people, and why Obama seems to be surviving the Syrian crisis, politically, quite
well thank you.
As Washington Post political analyst Greg Sargent found when
he looked
at the polling data, the "Beltway establishment criticism, which has
focused largely on process and theatrics, is deeply misguided and disconnected
from how Americans view the situation. ... There is just no evidence
Americans see this through the prism favored by establishment pundits -- that
adapting to shifting circumstances is not 'resolute' or 'decisive,' and is
therefore inherently a bad thing that has 'weakened' the presidency and the
country."
In a WaPo poll, 60 percent said Obama “sticks with his
principles,” roughly unchanged since January 2012. 46 percent said his handling
of the Syria issue “has not made much difference to U.S. leadership,” while only
32 percent say it weakened the country. "What we really need,"
Sargent concluded, "is a reevaluation of all the unstated assumptions
that shape establishment discourse about these matters."
How true, how true. And how surprising to see it said by an
in-house analyst for the nation's most ultra-establishment news organization.
Fortunately some of those establishment assumptions are no
longer unstated. The debate about whether to attack Syria brought them out of
the woodwork and into the pundits' columns, as they urged the president to get
tough. So we can start the reevaluation by looking back on the punditry of
recent weeks.
Let's consider a couple of examples.
"Principle backed by credible force made the United
States the anchor of global security since 1945," New York Times columnist
Roger Cohen asserted. Credibility depends on sending a clear message and
then acting upon it. But there has been no "message discipline on Syria
from the careening Obama administration," Cohen lamented. Obama's "wavering
has looked like acquiescence to a global power shift. ... America signaled an
inward turn that leaves the world anchorless." It's all about signals and
messaging (or, as Sargent put it, theatrics).
If an American president does not consistently send a consistent
message of strength and resolve, we'll end up with "an anchorless
world," a "post-American world -- and that means chaos.” Why? Cohen
quoted W.H. Auden: “'The ogre does what ogres can.'” Once you give ogres
the message that they can run wild, chaos reigns.
Vali Nasr, dean of
Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies (a famous training ground for the foreign policy elite), was equally
worried about ogres. In an op-ed, he wrote: "The Obama
administration has no choice but to enforce the 'red line' the president laid
out a year ago. To maintain American credibility -- and his own -- President
Obama has to do so quickly and decisively."
Why? For Nasr, too, it's about the theatrics of signals and messages, because they shape impressions and
perceptions." Enforcing the red line "would impress American
allies and adversaries alike." By "dithering," the president is "reinforcing
the perception that the United States is no longer keen on leading the world."
That perception "will embolden America’s adversaries
and deject its friends. America could soon find itself alone in standing up to
Iran or North Korea, or in pushing back against China and Russia. ... Shirking
from our global responsibilities will only create bigger problems that will
eventually raise both the cost and the likelihood of American intervention."
Thus saith the establishment.
Now let's look at a few of the unstated assumptions, the
premises you have to accept if these words by eminent foreign policy analysts
are going to make any sense:
The geopolitical world that matters is divided into two and
only two parts: America's adversaries and friends, the bad (ogre) guys and the
good guys. The bad guys are always pushing against the good guys, trying to do
as much evil as they can. If they aren't kept in check, the world situation
keeps shifting and changing. Life gets unpredictable; it's not fully under
anyone's control. And whenever no one is in control, the only alternative is
chaos. Who can feel secure facing a growing tide of chaos?
The U.S. has a unique responsibility to keep the world
securely under control because the U.S. is the only nation with enough power to
do it. So America has to prevent the bad guys from pushing too hard and
fomenting too much change. Fortunately that usually doesn't require military
force. It merely requires a message that is as firm and unchanging as we want
the world to be: If you keep pushing, you'll pay such a high price that the
pushing simply won't be worth it.
But if America's spokesman, the president, doesn't stand
firm -- if he's constantly moving and
shifting -- the bad guys have no reason to believe that the world is under strict
control. They won't expect to pay any great price for making the world move and
shake even more. So they'll keep on pushing.
Eventually the U.S. will have to stop them, to prevent
global chaos. But when "eventually" comes around, the only way to
stop them may be with violence. And that would be a shame, since it could have
been done with a firm, unwavering message --backed up by the mere threat of
force.
It's a simple story that any average grade-school child
could understand. In its childlike simplicity it has all the charm and appeal
of a good myth. Indeed, it's part and parcel of America's prevailing myth, the myth
of homeland insecurity.
But it's taught as perfectly logical fact and common sense in
the nation's most elite grad schools, institutes, and think tanks, where the foreign
policy establishment is trained -- and where reevaluation of unstated
assumptions is strictly taboo.
So the establishment can't see the fundamental contradiction
in its favorite narrative.
On the one hand, the story assumes that the bad guys are reasonable.
They'll understand a clear, consistent message from Washington, do a perfectly
rational cost-benefit analysis, and figure out that the cost of whatever action
the U.S. has proscribed (for example, using chemical weapons) isn't worth the
benefit.
On the other hand, it assumes that the bad guys are ogres.
And ogres, as every child knows, do evil simply for the sake of doing evil,
whether it makes any sense or not. In psychological terms, their reasoning
faculties are overwhelmed by their impulses. Or, to put it theologically, their
will is determined not by reason but by original sin.
Why put it theologically? Because the establishment
narrative was christened back in the 1930s by the highly influential theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr. George Kennan, who did so much to turn this story into policy
in the early cold war years, called Niebuhr "the father of us all."
What Niebuhr
taught "us all" (to put it a bit too simply) is that people are
sinners because they want to assert and aggrandize themselves without limit.
When sin takes over, reason and common sense go out the door. So does good
order. Order depends on limits; evildoers, driven by sin, know no limits.
Logic creates orderly structures out of the chaos of the world,
Niebuhr taught. But when sin lets impulse loose it destroys all orderly
structures and limits in its rush to gratify its whims and wishes. As Yeats
said, "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold." Then we get Roger
Cohen's "anchorless world."
But here's the rub: Since the ogre-ish bad guys are driven
by sin, they'll always let impulse trump reason. Why, then, should we think
that they will or can do any cost-benefit analysis, no matter how unwavering
the message from Washington? Why should we think that any message or signal has
the power to hold back the chaos?
That's just one of the lapses in logic we'll have to confront if
we follow Greg Sargent's advice, as we should, and start reevaluating all
the unstated assumptions that shape the establishment narrative.
There is still plenty to criticize in Barack Obama's foreign
policy. But if his recent shift on Syria helps to send the foreign policy elite
and their pundits back to school, this time to learn with some really rigorous
logic and common sense, it will be one big point in the president's favor.