Palin & Executive Authority
Admittedly, this second approach sometimes wasn’t easy. Take, for example, Palin’s statement about the criteria for the United States to use nuclear weapons. (The Alaska governor offered an incoherent, 15-second response, and then asked moderate Gwen Ifill if she could talk about Afghanistan. Ifill, incredibly, said yes.) But perhaps Palin’s most significant response came near the end of the debate, when she spoke about the powers of the vice presidency. While her answer was somewhat rambling, she praised the “flexibility” inherent in the VP’s constitutional powers, and said she wanted to expand the vice president’s role in the legislative arena.
This issue was a significant one in 2005, when the administration floated the idea of using Dick Cheney’s role as president of the Senate to modify the institution’s filibuster rules. (The so-called “Gang of 14” compromise aborted the administration’s initiative.) Taking Palin at her word, she envisions a dramatic expansion of the executive’s authority into traditionally legislative prerogatives.
Of course, it’s possible that Palin was simply spouting talking points, and had no clear sense of what she was actually saying. (Her interview with Katie Couric about her favorite vice president revealed no depth about the vice president’s powers.) But her remarks last night weren’t the only time candidate Palin has offered a sweeping conception of executive authority.
Palin’s response to Alaska’s “troopergate” scandal has also demonstrated an aggressive conception of executive power. Yesterday, Alaska Superior Court Judge Peter Michalski ruled against six pro-Palin legislators who were trying to quash the investigation—on the grounds that the legislature lacked the constitutional authority to investigate the executive branch. He also upheld the legislature’s authority to issue subpoenas—despite the assertion of the Palin-appointed state attorney general, Talis Colberg, who claimed that subpoenaed witnesses didn’t have to testify.
Understandably, the vice-presidential debate overshadowed Michalski’s decision, and most press reports have noted merely that the court allowed the investigation to proceed. The brief on behalf of Michalski's decision 30-page ruling, however, deserves greater attention: it was a stunningly blunt rejection of the pro-Palin arguments, and an unusually eloquent testimony to legislative prerogatives.
The brief termed the legislators’ “historic” filing “one of the most bizarre challenges to Alaska’s separation of powers doctrine in the history of the state.” And his ruling didn’t minimize the stakes: “That the challenge is brought by six legislators—apparently blind to the effect their short-term political gambit could have on the strength of the institution they represent—is sadly ironic.”
As the brief came to understand, the legislators’ basic claim—that a legislature lacks the constitutional authority to oversee and investigate the activities of an executive—so fundamentally challenged American constitutional theory that few on-point cases exist. Those that do, unsurprisingly, all uphold legislative power, and in this sense the ruling provides a convenient library of state and federal cases on the question. The judge termed it “lamentable, if understandable,” that the pro-Palin legislators failed to cite even one case to substantiate their claims.
At times, the brief could scarcely contain its sarcasm. Taking note of the legislators’ demand that Michalski stop the investigation lest it make “the Alaska Legislature and the State of Alaska a laughingstock,” the brief implied that the activities of Palin, Colberg, and the legislators themselves made the state a “laughingstock.”
At other times, the brief was nothing short of brutal. He chided the legislators’ “obviously half-hearted argument that cites no cases and relies on no recognizable legal principles.” It deemed their claims contrary to the “unambiguous” nature of Alaska law. It dismissed their assertion that the investigation violated Palin’s due-process rights as “absurd on its merits,” a misunderstanding of the difference between a legislative investigation and a criminal trial.
The brief concluded that agreeing with the pro-Palin legislators’ demand to halt the investigation on the grounds that it was “partisan” in motivation “can never be the right result in a free society with three independent branches of government. Rarely, if ever, has a request for such extraordinary injunctive relief been made on such flimsy legal grounds. The legal principles controlling this case are clear and fundamental. The Legislature has the power to investigate actions of the Executive.”
Perhaps Palin should have asked Michalski for help in fashioning her debate answer about the VP’s proper authority?
[Apology: My initial post attributed to Michalski the words of the brief. Also, news Sat. a.m.: the whole matter will now be decided in an emergency hearing before the AK Supreme Court, on Wednesday. It would be remarkable, indeed, if the Court upheld the position of the pro-Palin legislators.]