Andrew Bacevich: The Overhyping of David Petraeus
[Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is the editor of The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II. ]
... Although the deluded and disingenuous may persist in pretending otherwise, his mission is not to "win" the Iraq war. Coalition forces in Iraq are not fighting to achieve victory. Their purpose is far more modest. According to [David] Petraeus himself, U.S. troops and their allies are "buying time for Iraqis to reconcile." President Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have explicitly endorsed this new strategy, but history will remember Petraeus as its principal architect. To avoid the fate of his hapless predecessors, Petraeus must show that his strategy of buying-time-to-reconcile can produce tangible results. Yet an exploration of what the buying-time strategy actually means reveals that the prospects of its success are exceedingly slim. The cult of Petraeus exists not because the general has figured out the war but because hiding behind the general allows the Bush administration to postpone the day when it must reckon with the consequences of its abject failure in Iraq.
The most fundamental question that should be asked about the strategy is: Exactly how much time does Petraeus need to buy? The answer: a lot. With his frequent references to "the Washington clock" and "the Baghdad clock," Petraeus himself has recognized that "buying time" is by no means a simple proposition. The problem with the two clocks--one driven by domestic politics and the other connected to events in Iraq itself--is that they are wildly out of synch. As Petraeus himself has acknowledged, "The Washington clock is ticking faster than the Baghdad clock." Indeed, the steady erosion of popular and congressional support for the war, lately even among Republicans, suggests that time on the Washington clock has all but expired.
To correct this situation, Petraeus speaks of "trying to speed up the Baghdad clock a bit to produce some progress on the ground that can, perhaps ... put a little more time on the Washington clock." Yet Petraeus himself must recognize that this qualifies at best as a long shot. He knows that any counterinsurgency is by definition a protracted project. Success requires not weeks or months of exertions but years. As he told the BBC in a recent interview, "The average counterinsurgency is somewhere around a nine- or a ten-year endeavor." For his strategy to succeed, putting "a little more time" on the Washington clock won't come close to doing the trick. Indeed, unless the Petraeus strategy gains the firm and enthusiastic support of President Bush's successor, it doesn't stand a chance of working. Yet, unless John McCain's campaign pulls off a remarkable turnaround--an unlikely event--the president who takes office in January 2009 won't have campaigned on a strategy of "buying time" to prolong the Iraq war....
Read entire article at New Republic
... Although the deluded and disingenuous may persist in pretending otherwise, his mission is not to "win" the Iraq war. Coalition forces in Iraq are not fighting to achieve victory. Their purpose is far more modest. According to [David] Petraeus himself, U.S. troops and their allies are "buying time for Iraqis to reconcile." President Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have explicitly endorsed this new strategy, but history will remember Petraeus as its principal architect. To avoid the fate of his hapless predecessors, Petraeus must show that his strategy of buying-time-to-reconcile can produce tangible results. Yet an exploration of what the buying-time strategy actually means reveals that the prospects of its success are exceedingly slim. The cult of Petraeus exists not because the general has figured out the war but because hiding behind the general allows the Bush administration to postpone the day when it must reckon with the consequences of its abject failure in Iraq.
The most fundamental question that should be asked about the strategy is: Exactly how much time does Petraeus need to buy? The answer: a lot. With his frequent references to "the Washington clock" and "the Baghdad clock," Petraeus himself has recognized that "buying time" is by no means a simple proposition. The problem with the two clocks--one driven by domestic politics and the other connected to events in Iraq itself--is that they are wildly out of synch. As Petraeus himself has acknowledged, "The Washington clock is ticking faster than the Baghdad clock." Indeed, the steady erosion of popular and congressional support for the war, lately even among Republicans, suggests that time on the Washington clock has all but expired.
To correct this situation, Petraeus speaks of "trying to speed up the Baghdad clock a bit to produce some progress on the ground that can, perhaps ... put a little more time on the Washington clock." Yet Petraeus himself must recognize that this qualifies at best as a long shot. He knows that any counterinsurgency is by definition a protracted project. Success requires not weeks or months of exertions but years. As he told the BBC in a recent interview, "The average counterinsurgency is somewhere around a nine- or a ten-year endeavor." For his strategy to succeed, putting "a little more time" on the Washington clock won't come close to doing the trick. Indeed, unless the Petraeus strategy gains the firm and enthusiastic support of President Bush's successor, it doesn't stand a chance of working. Yet, unless John McCain's campaign pulls off a remarkable turnaround--an unlikely event--the president who takes office in January 2009 won't have campaigned on a strategy of "buying time" to prolong the Iraq war....