Historians/History

Pitfalls with the Nixon Tapes and How to Avoid Them

by Richard A. Moss

Mr. Moss is a government consultant and lives in Northern Virginia with his wife and son. He recently defended his doctoral dissertation, "Behind the Backchannel: Achieving Détente in U.S.-Soviet relations, 1969-1972," at The George Washington University. From 2001-2006, Moss worked as a graduate student intern at the State Department's Office of the Historian. Moss returned as a contract historian at the Office of the Historian from August 2007 to June 2009. During the latter time period, Moss overhauled the quality control system and transcribed or reviewed over 2000 pages of transcripts for over 30 published and forthcoming Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes. This work included the 'American Republics' volume cited below. He regularly contributes to nixontapes.org.

The views presented here do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government or the U.S. Department of State.

On July 20, 2009, Secrecy News reported that the Office of the Historian at the U.S. State Department had quietly revised the preface to latest volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States to be published, an electronic-only volume on “American Republics, 1969-1972.” The new preface states that tape transcripts are merely “interpretations” of the tapes themselves, which are the original “documents.” Steven Aftergood, the author of the story and head of the Federation of American Scientists Project on Secrecy, also detailed a number of embarrassing errors in a volume on the Soviet Union published in December 2006.

The revised disclaimer was long overdue. In the late 1970s, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) decided that the recordings were the record and that its transcripts prepared for a number of court cases should not be regarded as 100% accurate. The State Department could have learned from NARA’s example. Since day one, nixontapes.org has urged readers to trust their own ears and to listen to the audio themselves. That is the point of the website: to make the audio easily accessible and to thereby empower researchers.

Tape transcription can be prone to error, even under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, the problems highlighted by Mr. Aftergood have less to do with differences of “interpretation” and more to with the work environment described in detail by a recent report by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The OIG report scarcely mentioned the tapes project—something of an oddity inasmuch as nearly every volume that covers the Nixon administration includes transcripts. Furthermore, disagreements over the tapes were one of the underlying sources of tension in the office.

THE FLAWED TRANSCRIPTS
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, December 2006) | Link to Volume

Flawed transcripts prepared under the pre-2007 quality control system. Reviewed twice, possibly three times by two transcribers/compilers before being published. Repetition and stuttering have been omitted. Note the number and degree of substantive errors in these “interpretations.”

**Note that the corrected versions have been brought up roughly to the level of the post-August 2007 quality control standards, although we did not have access to the same resources as the State Department**

[Corrected PDFs include time codes that correspond to the transcribed portions]

[We recommend right-clicking on the “Complete Conversation Audio” and downloading the file to your computer for an easier listening experience]

Oval Office Conversation No. 670-13, February 14, 1972, 1:04 – 2:25 p.m.

Corrected PDF; Original PDF; Complete Conversation Audio; Log

Summary of errors:
-Fails to note that Haldeman was not only present but participated in a number of the exchanges
-Minor, yet numerous omissions (“I mean,” And,” etc.—also brief exchanges), grammatical & editorial errors, et cetera.
-Due to omission of Haldeman from introduction of editorial note, in at least one instance, Haldeman was misidentified as Nixon.

Kissinger (FRUS): And there will be another one in San Diego.
Kissinger (Probably): And, then we had another one in San Diego.

Nixon (FRUS): —with the hope that we will lay off our preemptive air strikes.
Nixon (Probable): Maybe’s he’s invited you for lunch with the hope that we will lay off of our preemptive airstrikes.

Kissinger (FRUS): They think you are getting ready to club the North Vietnamese.
Kissinger (Probable): They think you’re getting ready to clobber North Vietnam.

Kissinger (FRUS): That is—
Kissinger (Probable): That is a big deal.

Nixon (FRUS): The second thing it made me think of was that—
Nixon (Probable): The second thing it may be, Henry, but the second thing they make be thinking of is that they’re inviting—

Nixon (FRUS): I can’t believe that they would tell you on the other side of the coin, now I might be wrong, but they would have you for a private meeting and then proceed to kick the hell out of us.
Nixon (Probable): I can’t believe that they would tell you, on the other side of the coin—and I might be wrong—that they would have you for a private meeting and then proceed to kick the hell out of us prior to that time.

Nixon (FRUS): Because that’s why [unclear].
Nixon (Probable): Because that’s why I need you to put the condition—stick with the condition.

Nixon (FRUS): If you accepted the meeting and then they kicked the hell out of us and then we cancelled we’re in a [unclear] if you warn them in advance. Right?
Nixon: (Probable): If you accepted the meeting, and then they kicked the hell out of us, and then we cancelled, we’re in a bad way. We should warn them in advance that—right?

Kissinger (FRUS): Because if they hadn’t they would have had people there looking at their holes.
Nixon (FRUS): Yeah. That they didn’t amount to anything?

Kissinger (Probable): Because, if they hadn’t, they would have had people there looking at the holes.
Nixon (Probable): Yeah—
Kissinger (Probable): And—
Nixon: —and showing that they didn’t amount to anything.

Kissinger (FRUS): And we’ve had another report that has been particularly—they inflicted enormous casualties on some troop barracks.
Kissinger (Probable): And we’ve had another report that in Vinh, particularly, they inflicted enormous casualties on some troop barracks.

Kissinger (FRUS): On the other hand, you and I know that you were going to go for broke against the North.
Kissinger (Probable): On the other hand, you and I know that you weren’t going to go for broke against the North.

Nixon: (FRUS): And then afterwards admitted Bhutto let you down.
Nixon (Probable): Then, afterwards, admitted to Bhutto that, “We [the Chinese] let you down.”

Kissinger (FRUS): What they do is they’re asking for, cuddling for, the things we are going to do anyway. Like troop withdrawal.
Kissinger (Probable): What they do is they’re asking toughly for the things they know we’re going to do anyway, like troop withdrawals.

Kissinger (FRUS): So that the North Vietnamese will not forgive.
Kissinger (Probable): So that, the North Vietnamese will never forgive them.

Kissinger (FRUS): They’ve already objected in October so they—
Kissinger (Probable): They’ve already rejected it in October, so that—
  Oval Office Conversation No. 720-4, May 5, 1972, 8:55 – 10:09 a.m.

Corrected Version; Original PDF; Complete Conversation Audio; Log

Summary of errors:  (FRUS) Nixon: I want you to be rather cool, particularly outgoing with Dobrynin.
(Probable) Nixon: I want you to be rather than cool, particularly outgoing with Dobrynin.

(FRUS) Nixon: They might [unclear].
(Probable) Nixon: That’s the thing I said the other day.

(FRUS) Nixon: So that would be ineffective.
(Probable) Nixon: And so, in net, it would be ineffective.

(FRUS) Nixon: Well then, that perhaps is the mess we’re in because we can’t bomb unless we bomb now. We can’t bomb and then have—you can’t bomb and then have them kicking us around while we’re in Moscow. You see, that’s the point Thieu made which is tremendously compelling.
(Probable) Nixon: Well then, that perhaps is the convincing reason, because we can’t bomb unless we bomb enough. We can’t bomb and then have—you can’t bomb and then have them kicking us around while we’re in Moscow. You see? That’s the point that you made which is tremendously compelling.

(FRUS) Kissinger: One is does the United States put a Communist government into power and allow itself and its enemies to defeat its friends?
(Probable) Kissinger: One is: Does the United States put a Communist government into power and ally itself with its enemies to defeat its friends?

(FRUS) Nixon: You see—look, Henry, there’s nobody that’s more aware, because I, like you, one of the reasons we’re both in here, is that we both take a long view, which goddamn few Americans do. That’s why I said that we put out a little game plan if we wanted to cancel the summit first and then going after them, which I think we’re absolutely right in not doing that.
Kissinger: Now that is something—
Nixon: That’s good advice, because it’s something I’ve seen. I led you into that—I led you out of that, yes I did.
(Probable) Nixon: They’ve had it before. You see? Look, Henry, there’s nobody that’s more aware, because I, like you—I think one of the reasons [unclear: we’re both in here] is that we both take a long view, which goddamn few Americans do. That’s why I said, “Henry, let’s put out a little game plan [unclear] cancelling the summit first,” and they’re doing that, which I think we’re absolutely right in not doing—
Kissinger: No, that is certainly not—
Nixon: That’s good advice on the part of Connally.
Kissinger: That is certainly—
Nixon: He has seen something I had not seen. And I led you into that.
Kissinger: Well—
Nixon: I led you into that. Yes, I did.

(FRUS) Nixon: Now, here, the blockade plus, you understand—
(Probable) Nixon: Now, here, the blockade plus the bombing, you understand?

(FRUS) Nixon: Well, everybody knows then, that I’ve thrown down the goddamn gauntlet, and there it is. Do you want to pick it up? And, you see, I’m going to lift the blockade as I’ve said. It’s not over yet—the bombing’s not over yet.
(Probable) Nixon: Well, then everybody knows then that I’ve thrown down the goddamn gauntlet, and there it is. And [do] they want to pick it up? And, you see, that I’m going to live with the blockade, as I’ve said. Well, it’s an ultimatum.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Bombing is not an ultimatum.

(FRUS) Nixon: Even if it all goes down the tubes, we will be remembered as the ones who went to China. And in the future, that’ll work out.
(Probable) Nixon: You have to remember, even if it all goes down the tubes, we will just—we will be remembered, as Clare Booth Luce says, as the ones who went to China. And in the future, that’ll work out.

(FRUS) Nixon: Who could help us to do—all right?
(Probable) Nixon: Who could help? Who else could do it?

(FRUS) Nixon: […] I saw the inevitability of McGovern, or Humphrey, or the only other possibility is Teddy, who might be the worst of the three.
Kissinger: Certainly. No, McGovern’s the worst.
Nixon: But anyway, as I saw that—McGovern would be the worst of the three for sure […].
(Probable) Nixon: […] I saw the inevitability of McGovern or Humphrey, or, if they’d have him, the only other possibility is Teddy, who might be the worst of the three.
Kissinger: Certainly the worst.
Nixon: But any of them—
Kissinger: Well, McGovern’s—
Nixon: —in any event , because I saw that—No, McGovern would be the worst of the three for sure if he gets in […].

(FRUS) Nixon: All right, I’m considering going […]
(Probable) Nixon: All right, I have considered it all […]

(FRUS) Nixon: […] I assured Rogers and Laird, [unclear] let’s make another offer, and have we agreed to offer this, and well, I don’t know if we have, and they’re wining and bitching about it. Well, Henry, you know and I know this is not true.
(Probable) Nixon: […] I assured Rogers and Laird with regard to this. They said, “Oh, let’s make another offer, and have we agreed to offer this,” I don’t know whether we have, you know, and they’re wining and bitching about it. Well, Henry, you know and I know that that’s just not true anymore.

(FRUS) Nixon: Oh, I hope they know, the guy across from me helped to break them off—did you get that across?
(Probable) Nixon: Well, I hope they know—it got across that they helped to break them off. Did Porter make the case—?

TRANSCRIPTS WITH REVISED PROCESS
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, July 2009) | Link to Volume

-Accurate transcripts prepared and reviewed under overhauled, post-August 2007, quality control system.
-Reviewed at least 5 times by at least 3 different transcribers/compilers.
-Stuttering has largely been omitted, although there is some repetition per compiler’s discretion.
-Note how accurate the transcripts are and how poor the audio quality is.
-Also note how the accuracy is consistent and the absence of major substantive mistakes in these “interpretations.”

[PDFs include time codes that correspond to the transcribed portions]
[We recommend right-clicking on the “Complete Conversation Audio” and downloading the file to your computer for an easier listening experience]

Oval Office Conversation No. 462-5, March 5, 1971, 8:30 – 10:15 a.m. Link   PDF; Complete Conversation Audio; Log

Oval Office Conversation No. 523-4, June 16, 1971, Unknown Time between 3:41 and 4:30 p.m. Link
PDF; Complete Conversation Audio; Log

Oval Office Conversation No. 581-4, September 30, 1971, 10:07 – 11:03 a.m. Link
PDF; Complete Conversation Audio; Log

Oval Office Conversation No. 735-1, June 16, 1972, 10:31 a.m. – 12:10 p.m. Link
PDF; Complete Conversation Audio; Log

[1] Moss knows this to be the case because he was responsible for the entire transcription and quality-control effort between summer 2007 and June 2009.
[2] Audio quality was never part of original design, nor was longevity. In fact, the taping system was designed to maximize the amount of audio on one reel, which meant slowing the tape speed down and using large reels of thin tape. This design consideration was the polar opposite of audio quality, which would have required speeding up a thicker tape. The issue certainly was not the actual equipment, however, which was state of the art in 1971.
[3] Noise-reduced digital files are actually smaller than the unadulterated originals, even at the same bitrate and duration.