Where Have All the Voters Gone?
Writing in the 1950s, political observers were optimistic about the future
of voter participation. Turnout had fallen sharply in 1944 and 1948. In Britain
as well as the United States, partisan activity was waning. No analyst has fully
explained why this had to be the case or why the wartime governing parties in
both England and the United States suffered stinging defeats in postwar legislative
elections.
By the 1950s, however, voter turnout was back to normal, and all signs in the
United States pointed to ever higher rates. College-educated Americans were
half again as likely to vote as those who had not finished high school. With
college attendance on the rise, the trend appeared unmistakable. Moreover, women
had been steadily closing the voting gap that had existed ever since they had
gained the vote in 1920. Their turnout rate initially was not much more than
half that of men; by the 1950s, the gap had narrowed to 10 percentage points.
And signs of racial change were clearly evident. It would only be a matter of
time before literacy tests, poll taxes, and other legal barriers to black participation
were removed.
Yet, turnout did not increase after the 1950s. In fact, the period from 1960
to 2000 marks the longest ebb in turnout in US history. Turnout was nearly 65
percent of the adult population in the 1960 presidential election and stood
at only 51 percent in 2000. In 2002, turnout was 39 percent in the November
election and a mere 18 percent in the congressional primaries.
Fewer voters are not the only sign of the public's waning interest in political
campaigns. In 1960, 60 percent of the nation's television households had their
sets on and tuned to the October presidential debates. In 2000, fewer than 30
percent were tuned in.
What's going on here? Why is the bottom dropping out on electoral participation?
During the 2000 election campaign, as part of the Vanishing Voter Project at
Harvard University's Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy
(www.vanishingvoter.org), we interviewed nearly 100,000 Americans to discover
why they are disengaging from elections. Combined with polling data from earlier
elections, this evidence provides partial answers to the puzzle of the vanishing
voter.
In this article, the first in a series of five to be presented a week apart
on HHN, I will summarize the effect that changes in the political parties have
had. Subsequent articles will explore the impact of changes in the media, candidate
behavior, political competition, and election law.
Parties and Participation
There was a long period in American history when elections were waged on economic
issues powerful enough to define the two major parties and divide the public.
These issues stemmed from Americans' deepest hopes and fears, and had the power
to cement their loyalty to a party and draw them to the polls. That era ended
with the triumph of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, which, along with Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society, put in place government programs that greatly reduced
the sources of economic resentment and insecurity that had fueled party conflict.
A safety net for the economically vulnerable was in place, as were policy mechanisms
for stabilizing the economy. An electoral majority that could be easily rallied
by calls for economic redistribution no longer existed.
As the economic issue weakened, a large set of less comprehensive issues emerged.
Civil rights, street crime, school prayer, and welfare dependency were among
the earliest of these issues, which were followed by others including abortion,
the environment, education, and global trade. All were important, but they intersected
with each other in confounding ways. And none had the reach or the endurance
of the economic issue. As a result, the issues of one election were usually
different than the issues that had dominated the previous election or would
be at the forefront in the next one.
How could the political parties create cohesive and enduring coalitions out
of this mix of issues? The short answer is that they could not do so. The issues
were too crosscutting and too numerous for either party to combine them in a
way that could easily satisfy a following. By the 1970s, self-described independents
accounted for a third of the electorate. People also found it increasingly difficult
to think and talk about the parties. Americans were better educated than they
had been in the 1950s, but they had a harder time saying what the parties represented.
In the 1950s, less than one in ten had nothing to say when asked in polls what
they liked and disliked about the parties. By the 1970s, three in ten had nothing
to say.
Since then, political parties have not recovered their prominence. They are
relatively weak objects of loyalty and thought, which has diminished Americans'
concern with election politics. Like any other emotional attachment, party loyalty
heightens interest and commitment. For its part, party awareness reflects people's
ability to recognize what's at stake in election politics and the options available
to them. "My mind has just gone blank," said a Florida resident in
2000 when asked in one of our surveys to describe the parties.
Americans who today have a party loyalty and an awareness of the parties have
a voting rate more than twice that of those who call themselves independents
and who cannot find words with which to describe the parties. That was true
also in the 1950s. The difference today is that the percentage of citizens in
the high-voting group is much smaller and the percentage in the low-voting group
is much larger than in the 1950s. The type of citizen that votes less often
has been gradually replacing the type that votes more often.
The change in party politics helps to explain why, disproportionately, the decline
in participation has been concentrated among Americans of low income. Although
a class bias in turnout has been a persistent feature of U.S. elections, the
gap has widened to a chasm. The voting rate among those at the bottom of the
income ladder is only half that of those at the top. During the era of the economic
issue, working-class Americans were at the center of political debate and party
conflict. They now occupy the periphery of a political world in which money
and middle-class concerns are ascendant. In 2000, low-income respondents were
roughly 30 percent more likely than those in the middle- or top-income groups
to say the election's outcome would have little or no impact on their lives.
The change in party politics also helps to explain why candidates now have trouble
crafting messages that voters find compelling. Candidates have never had so
many communication weapons at their disposal, yet they have never found it so
hard to frame their message. As Franklin Roosevelt's voice crackled into living
rooms through the vacuum-tube radio, his pledge to "the forgotten man"
had a persuasive power that today's media consultants would envy. Listeners
didn't have to be told what FDR had in mind or to whom he was speaking. Campaign
messages today are strikingly different in the wide range of issues they address,
the contradictions they contain, the speed with which they turn over, and the
small percentage of voters with whom they resonate. After their defeat in the
2002 midterm election, Democratic leaders were roundly criticized for failing
to put out a message that captivated voters. However, Democratic politicians
are neither stupid nor apolitical. If a simple and compelling message was readily
available, they would have seized it. Such messages are today quite rare. If
Republicans could not rely on their perennial "let's cut taxes" pitch-which
is now closer to a fight song than a true governing philosophy-they would face
the same problem.
A century ago, James Bryce worried that the growing complexity of American society
threatened the parties' ability to forge and mobilize cohesive majorities. Social
complexity is now orders of magnitude greater and has clearly overtaken the
parties. The consequences include a lower rate of electoral participation.