The penchant for secrecy on the part of the Bush Administration plus the traumatic events of 9/11 have set back access to historical information by more than two decades. Any attentive American has heard about the failure to open information for the 9/11 Commission and the Congressional Intelligence Committees but few realize the full effect of the Bush Administration and their wars, both against terrorism and for “democracy” in Afghanistan and Iraq. War always expands the power of presidents and this president has used some of his power to draw the curtain on past information as well as the present. Fears developed from current events invariably are reflected in the closing of documents from the past.

Even the Congress is not immune. Concern over the “loss” of secrets at Los Alamos stimulated the Kyle Amendment in October 1998 which mandated a second look at documents previously declassified. It was an expensive, time consuming venture which further delayed responses to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Over time, declassifiers looked at 1.3 million pages. They found 365 pages that should not have been declassified under their new guidelines. Most of these pages were concerned with nuclear facilities abroad.

If we examine the litany of new restrictions on information, we can see how little they relate to current problems. Long before 9/11, fomer Attorney General Ashcroft reversed the Clinton guidelines on FOIA requests. Whereas Attorney General Reno had informed the agencies that they were to declassify when in doubt, Ashcroft instructed the agencies to classify unless there was a clear reason to declassify. He even went one step further to assure them that the Justice Department would defend their actions.

Then, on November 1, 2001, part of the group of decisions that seemed caused by events of the previous September, Bush issued an Executive Order to “clarify” the Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978. The PRA had finally implemented a law that designated presidential papers as federal records. Starting with Reagan, presidents could no longer hold title to their records. It was an unambiguous act that clearly stated a timetable for release of records and did not need clarifying. The new Executive Order, in fact, muddied the water. Now, before documents from presidential advisers (which were presumably given in confidence) can be released, BOTH the past president AND the current president must agree on their release. This provision could allow Bush to keep back papers involving his father on Iran-contra from the Reagan years and details on the incursion into Panama, for example. Considering that presidential papers tend to slowly open over a 20-30 year period, any number of ramifications can be foreseen.

Another act of “clarification” came with the promulgation of the Executive Order on national security documents. Clinton’s order had set a date of 25 years for automatic declassification. He then gave the agencies an additional 5 years to implement the order. Proudly declaring that unlike other presidents, the Bush administration did not establish a brand-new executive order, the officials merely changed the Clinton order. First it gave the agencies another 3 ½ years to automatically declassify. Agency heads can delay another five years if needed (and if history holds, it will be needed). Microforms can take another 5 years and another 3 years can be allowed if other nations have an interest in the record and send it through their declassification staff. Finally, no file will be declassified until the most recent document is 25 years old. At least one person who approved this executive order had no idea that some files in the State Department may run for 20 years. When all the 5,3, and forevers are added up, some files will clearly be closed for 50 years.

The “war” on terrorism has also brought with it a new category of records to be removed from public perusal. These are “records of concern.” They are not classified records but aren’t exactly declassified these days either. For the most part they relate to the country’s infrastructure. These records may not seem important to many researchers but they are often crucial to the work of public historians and urban historians, among others. In addition, removing records sets a dangerous precedent for the future. Ultimately, we may find another ambiguous category of records. Some meetings in Washington now require all participants to agree (swear?) not to reveal what was said in the meeting. Are the resulting records going to be classified or only withdrawn?

Withdrawing records - but not reclassifying them - is another prevalent technique to keep information out of public hands. This was recently illustrated by the response of the CIA to the current volumes of the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). After examining the documents chosen for inclusion in the volumes, they set off for the National Archives to withdraw documents. The documents were not reclassified nor taken from the Archives. They were simply withdrawn and placed in a kind of no man's land with no indication as to when they would be released from custody.

Even in the best of times, our declassification system is Byzantine. The structural problem behind document release results from the assumption that the U.S. can tolerate no risk, not one slip up. A zero risk policy is responsible for the re-examination of millions of nuclear energy documents, withdrawal of over thirty year old CIA documents and of the lack of trust between declassifiers in different agencies. No policy is without risks, not even one that is obsessed with overcoming them.

Several times Bush and his spokesmen have indicated that they won’t need to worry about history’s evaluation of their administration. One nameless official even indicated that they wouldn’t be around in 80 years to see the results. Well, Mr. president, we have news for you. The next president may cancel your executive order and after 12 years your papers will be available for research. Even Henry Kissinger is facing his past these days. You can plan on the first book with footnotes from your records in about 20-25 years. History may not make governments honest but it has an uncanny ability to illuminate the dishonesty.

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This article was published originally by Historians Against the War (HAW) and is reprinted with permission.