Rumsfeld's Legacy: How Not to Run the Pentagon

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will go down in history as one of the most arrogant, inconsiderate, and – in the end, most incompetent secretaries of defense the US has had – at least since Robert MacNamara held the job.

When he first took over as secretary of defense, many were convinced that he would do an outstanding job.  After all, he had held the position previously under Gerald Ford, so most assumed that he understood the Pentagon and the uniformed military and would be able to work with them to bring about the many changes that most agreed were vital if the US military was to meet the challenges of the 20th century.  Furthermore, He had just turned the failing Searle Corporation around, making it into one of the giants of the pharmaceutical field.

The problem with Rumsfeld – and one that would haunt him throughout his six odd years in office – was that he was convinced that the uniformed military was too conservative, and unable to change.  From his perspective the changes needed were simple: greater reliance on high tech weapons combined with a cut-back in the number of troops needed to fight a war.  Consequently, he did his best in the beginning to keep the military “out of the action” – in fact, set-up study groups on the future of the military, groups that did not include any members of the serving uniformed military.  Needless to say, the military was outraged.

In order to gain control of the military, Rumsfeld focused directly on promotions.  No one could be promoted to three or four stars (or in some cases a one star), without Rumsfeld’s approval.  He was not interested in military officers who would disagree with him.  Their job was to implement his policies, not question them.

Rumsfeld then took on the US Army, an organization he was convinced was too hide-bound.  Besides, his high tech military would reduce the need for “grunts”.  Rumsfeld’s first goal was to reduce the Army by two divisions (so he could use the money saved for high tech weapons).  This came at a time when the Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki were asking for an additional two divisions just to carry out the missions assigned to them.  The result was constant conflict with the army and Shinseki.  To his credit, Shinseki behaved like a gentleman, while Rumsfeld and his cronies did their best to embarrass him and force him to retire.

Rumsfeld’s performance during the lead up to, and prosecution of the Iraq War was equally bad.  He was determined to use the Iraqi campaign to prove to the rest of the world, the accuracy of his military transformation policy.  “Shock and awe” would show the superiority of high tech warfare.  Toward this end, he repeatedly pounded General Tommy Franks to cut back the forces he needed for the attack from the 385,000 Franks’s predecessor, General Anthony Zinni, had estimated to the 140,000 actually utilized.  While it is hard to understand why General Franks permitted himself to be bullied into the lower number, it meant that there would be no troops available for what the military calls “Phase IV,” post-combat operations. He also convinced (or bullied) Franks into sending the 1st Cavalry Division back to its original base. Rumsfeld also interfered with one of the military’s most complex documents – the one that determines which units are activated and where they are sent.  As a result, the US ended up not having some critical units in Iraq.  To cite an example, there were not enough military police.  If more had been in Iraq, it is probable that with such competent regulars, we would have avoided  Abu Ghraib. 

Rumsfeld was right about one thing – shock and awe worked – against a rag-tag military force.  But when the Marines and soldiers got to Baghdad, it suddenly became apparent that the US did not have enough troops.  The latter stood by while the city was looted.  It is no surprise that shortly after the end of the Iraq War that General Franks announced he was retiring and went home.  It is also now clear that despite what Rumsfeld said, there were constant requests from the generals in the field for more troops – a request that Rumsfeld claimed was never made.

Of all the mistakes that the US made in Iraq, none was greater than the decision to bar from government and other institutions anyone who was a member in the Bath Party.  In Iraq, with a few exceptions, party membership was similar to party membership in the Soviet Union, necessary for certain jobs.  The policy, which was designed by Douglas Feith, implemented by Jerry Bremer, and approved by Rumsfeld put thousands of Iraqis out of work – physicians, nurses, teachers, lawyers, etc.  Then Bremer followed up with an equally disastrous policy – the dissolution of the Iraqi Army.   There were thousands of Iraqis who would have come back to the Army if offered the option.  Instead, they became insurgents.

During the period from mid-2003 until Rumsfeld was fired in November of 2006, there were repeated suggestions that the US should change its strategy – to one of counter-insurgency.  Rumsfeld would have none of it.  Instead, the US followed the same unsuccessful policy of “search and destroy.”  Finally with the Republican debacle in November, 2006, George Bush accepted Rumsfeld’s resignation.  That was shortly followed by the appointment of a new secretary of defense – Robert Gates -- who oversaw the introduction of a counterinsurgency strategy followed by a “surge” of  30,000 troops.  The result was a major drop in conflict, which created the possibility for reconciliation among the various factions in Iraq.

The sad thing about Rumsfeld was that his tenure did not have to be as disastrous as it was.  If he had been willing to work with officers like General Shinseki, who was already very aware of the need to revolutionize the way the Army fights wars, military transformation would be further along that it is now.  If Rumsfeld had selected a strong personality like General Hugh Shelton to lead the Joint Chiefs, an officer who was prepared to stand up to him, the US might never have invaded Iraq or of it had, would have done so with sufficient troops.   But Rumsfeld was certain that he and only he knew what was right.  It was a case of a highly talented individual “shooting himself in the foot,” by refusing to listen to those around him – especially those in uniform.