The Continuing U.S. Military Presence in Japan

…Is it really possible that the F-16 [Fighting Falcon], which represent[s] the sole aerial attack force of the U.S. Air Force in Japan, [will] soon vanish from the scene?  Seeking an answer, I queried sources in the U.S. departments of state and defense, the U.S. military in Japan, the Japanese ministries of defense and foreign affairs… everyone I know who was connected with U.S.-Japan relations.

But the answer was “No.”  One person connected to the U.S. base in Misawa [in northern Honshū] stated his total denial in the following terms:

At present, we have heard absolutely nothing about such a plan. There is a standing plan to upgrade the aging F-15s at Kadena with cutting-edge F-22 Raptors, but the F-16s are not going to be withdrawn.

Still, news of the plan to withdraw the F-16s caused a sensation.  At the Misawa city hall, which is committed to co-existence and co-prosperity with the base, city officials raised what amounted to screams:  “Withdrawal of the F-16s will impact base subsidies and throw the city’s fiscal planning into disarray.”  “We’ll end up in fiscal ruin, like the city of Yubari in Hokkaido.”

The ministries of foreign affairs and defense tried to quell these fears over the future viability of the city by denying the plan to withdraw the F-16s.  But the news reports left lingering, deep-seated suspicions such as those mentioned above.

Then why did news of such a plan emerge all of a sudden?  One military affairs expert explains the context this way:

I’ve been told that this withdrawal plan was one of numerous options that were prepared as draft proposals.  It was prepared by a government-contracted think tank.  It’s probable that a preliminary proposal like this got into the hands of one sector of the media as a result of a deliberate leak by the previous ruling party—the LDP—and people associated with the U.S. government who had cast their lot with the LDP over the reorganization of American forces in Japan.  The purpose, of course, was to cause a political shock to the DPJ-led government.

At the root of this maneuver was the dispute over the relocation of the Futenma Marine air base, which had become a political problem between the U.S. and the former Hatoyama government and which remains pending.  “The real aim of the leak was likely to get the government to comply with the existing agreement to move the base to the shore along Camp Schwab (in the waters off Henoko in Nago City).”

In other words, do as the U.S. wishes or American forces will pull out of Japan, leaving the country to face North Korea and its ballistic missiles on its own.  The LDP camp and the U.S. were posing this forceful challenge:  Is Japan—the DPJ—prepared to do this?

The F-16s were stationed at Misawa in 1985 as a forward presence in the strategy of containing the Soviet Far East military.  In the event of a conflict, their mission was to destroy Soviet air bases on Sakhalin and Etorofu Island to facilitate U.S. Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force patrols for nuclear submarines.

After the end of the Cold War, North Korea became the hypothetical enemy.  The F-16s are poised to deliver the first wave of surgical strikes, targeted at strategic installations such as anti-aircraft systems, missile-launching bases, and nuclear facilities.  From the North Korean perspective, they are knives pointed at the country’s throat.

For this reason, the impact on North Korea of the plan to withdraw the F-16s from Misawa cannot be overlooked. Senior Fellow John Park of the government-funded U.S. Institute for Peace offered an analysis along the following lines:  The withdrawal plan could send an erroneous message to North Korea, since the North Koreans watch every move the American make.  If the F-16s are withdrawn, North Korea could mistake this for a signal from the U.S. and see it as a chance to drive a wedge between Japan and the U.S.

Prime Minister Sato Eisaku (in office, 1964–72) once said, “With our constitution, Japan will absolutely never go outside the country.”  He made that statement before the Lower House budget committee in 1969, and at the time it was thought that the peace constitution prohibited the Self Defense Force from going overseas. Now, forty years later, escort ships and surveillance planes from the SDF have unfurled the rising sun flag in the Middle East—the world’s powder keg—and in the chaos of Africa.  The two eras are worlds apart. But some have raised objections to these activities.

Nagoya Gakuin’s Iijima:  

Under the Anti-Piracy Measures Law, the SDF can be sent anywhere in the world in the name of ‘anti-piracy measures.’ Moreover, these can be places where conflict could occur, and the SDF is able to attack first in some cases.”  Iijima points out that the 2001 law that enabled the SDF to provided refueling services in the Indian Ocean in support of the war in Afghanistan and the 2003 law that authorized the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq were both time-limited and specified the period of the troop dispatch, “but under the Anti-Piracy Measures Law, the SDF can be sent anywhere, anytime, at the sole discretion of the government. It has to be said that this is a very serious violation of the constitution.

The U.S.-Japan security treaty is an agreement that requires the U.S. to defend Japan in the event of an enemy attack.  Japan is under absolutely no obligation to defend the U.S.  However, the world situation after the end of the Cold War—or more to the point, the U.S.—would not allow Japan to remain within the narrow confines of East Asia.

A succession of laws have expanded the role of the SDF:  the 1999 law on emergency situations near Japan, the 2001 anti-terrorism law, the 2003 Iraq War law, and now the anti-piracy law.  As Iijima says, “Japan has become a country that can dispatch the SDF anywhere, anytime.”  Each step in this process has been taken under intense pressure from the U.S.

One military affairs expert raises the following question, regarding this rapid change in the character of the U.S.-Japan alliance:  “The present security treaty framework has become globalized, far surpassing the two-country agreement on defense cooperation that it was at the start.  It is still undergoing transformation at the present, and I wonder how many Japanese citizens really grasp the status of the security treaty/U.S.-Japan alliance?”

As the Futenma controversy has made clear, the Japanese government will, under pressure from the U.S., muzzle the people’s voice.  This is because it has no options other than the U.S.-Japan alliance to ensure the security that will determine the fate of the country.  At the mercy of successive governments with no vision, it is always the Japanese people who get the short end of the stick.