What Has Been Our Dominant Tradition in American History: Interventionism Or Isolationism?
The current Administration’s decision to intervene in Iraq resulted in a quick victory over Saddam Hussein’s forces but a slow and agonizing struggle to pacify a terrorist-traumatized country. This in turn has provoked intense debate and increased divisiveness within the nation. Many argue that we were not only misled by skimpy and faulty intelligence, but that we became uncharacteristically interventionist in the hopes of imposing democracy on an already divided nation. Others counter that having been attacked on 9/11 and facing what we believed to be the threat of weapons of mass destruction, we had to be pro-active in attacking Iraq after the obvious UN failures. Some go so far to argue that this pro-active intervention is simply a return to what we have done throughout our history as a nation. A recent eye-catching and disturbing article in a recent issue of U.S. News and World Report was entitled “Presidents At War” where Michael Barone argues that President Bush’s decision to attack Iraq was not a departure from the American tradition of war. On the contrary, Barone insists that the Administration’s move was “a return to the dominant tradition of our history.”
Michael Barone goes so far to assert that the United States “has never been an isolationist nation” and American forces have been “roaming the globe since the Revolutionary War.” Both statements are breathtakingly erroneous generalizations which must be challenged.
When we pose the question which is the title of this article, a brief survey of American history reveals an America that has been most often isolationist unless provoked to respond. The most recent war in Iraq was not based on any such American historical precedent which has tended to be responsive and reactive. The United States reacted and did not start either of the world wars. It was Stalin’s Soviet Union that blockaded Berlin in 1948 and built an “iron curtain” across Europe. America was a responsive and reactive, not preemptive, combatant in the Cold War. In 1950, when South Korea was invaded the United Nations and the United States reacted against this clear attack. Throughout most of our history America has reacted diplomatically and militarily to aggressive actions of other nations.
The War in Iraq marks a decidedly different and largely unprecedented path: One of preemptive action based on what proved to be inaccurate intelligence. American history fully justified our reaction in Afghanistan, a well understood and well supported response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11; however, the Iraq War, for better or worse, has little if any place in American tradition. It is a new and different role for America.
Idealism tempered by realism might well describe America’s “dominant tradition” throughout our history. Whether or not our interventionism in Iraq can fit within this tradition is most questionable. While the goal of creating a democratic Islamic Middle East is an idealistic experiment, it is at the very least fraught with incredible costs and risks, and subject to charges of being grossly unrealistic and naive. While such labels can be and should be debated, what cannot be ignored or denied is that the Administration has done what has not been done before --- and cannot be justified by past precedents or presidents.
While few would try to defend the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein, the question we face is whether the “dominant tradition of our history” and our reluctance to go to war without substantial provocation was a wise course to follow. If so, is our departure from it unwise? Are we blazing a dangerous if not foolish trail when we initiate war on the basis of skimpy information which later proves to be faulty? Can we afford to fight any and every perceived enemy? Do we have unlimited resources and ever faithful allies? How do we preserve a national consensus? How does our War in Iraq affect our focus on resurgent and militant Islam in much of the world, the rebirth of Russian influence, and the emerging strength of China?
As we face the dangers of today and tomorrow we do well to reflect upon the lessons of yesteryear when America earned the respect and admiration of the world not so much because of our power but our restraint. Generally speaking, we went to war as a reaction to what others did to us specifically and unequivocally. None of this is to say that we always reacted promptly enough or fought with pure motives, but there was much idealism and realism to support the statement that our history was shaped by idealism tempered by realism. We voice a sense of sadness that we may have forgotten a good precedent which may well have prevented us from being in a most difficult and divisive situation.
Related LinksMichael Barone: Presidents At War Walter E. Grinder and John Hagel III: Mearsheimer on the Tragedy of Great Power Politics Ronald Radosh: Isolationism Strikes Again