Presidency: Learning From Ike's Mistakes
Ever since the events of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush has sounded like a different man than the often awkward, fumbling candidate he seemed during the 2000 presidential campaign. Instead of presenting the image of a cheerful, likeable man who might have been in over his head, President Bush has come across in public as sober, engaged, serious, and cognizant that the country now faces a challenge unlike any in American history. His patience in building an alliance from a polyglot group of Arab moderates, former Soviet republics, and the sometimes prickly NATO allies has been surpassed only by his pursuit of a bilateral relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This has astonished many observers who assumed that Bush had not inherited any foreign policy acumen from his father. He has received accolades from both political parties, some confidants of former Vice President Al Gore have privately admitted that they were happy that Bush had defeated their candidate, and his public approval ratings are in the 90th percentile.
Some have attributed this transformation to the needs of the moment. Bush himself, those close to him have stated, believes that he has found his raison d'être as President: to defeat the worldwide terrorist network. At this critical moment, when leadership is so important, George W. Bush seems to have discovered the power of public rhetoric to lead a democracy during wartime.
And yet, before we wax rhapsodic over Bush's transformation into a strong, wartime President, it can be instructive to examine how previous American presidents have dealt with the question of rhetoric and policy. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, employed rhetoric during the 1950s as a foreign policy tool. An understanding of the relationship between public rhetoric and confidential, internal decision-making can enhance our understanding of American foreign policymaking and provide some useful lessons for Bush in the next few months.
Eisenhower and Dulles squandered a golden opportunity to accomplish their diplomatic goals during the 1950s. Both men were committed to the establishment of a strong system of collective security in Western Europe, pressed for détente with the Soviet Union, and argued for the maintenance of a"new" Germany that was divided yet committed to peace, prosperity, and stability. But this well-reasoned, rational, confidential policy rarely surfaced during the eight years in which Eisenhower and Dulles directed American diplomacy. By confidential I mean those policies or positions that Eisenhower and Dulles formulated during national security meetings, telephone conversations, and other internal deliberations.
Instead, this rational policy was overwhelmed by the practice of rhetorical policymaking that promoted a policy of confrontation between both Washington and Moscow and the U. S. and its allies. This rhetorical policymaking consisted of two components. On the one hand, the administration employed belligerent rhetoric in its private meetings (summits, conferences, and one-on-ones with diplomats) with the allies and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they employed the same tactic in public speeches, addresses, and press conferences. By constantly emphasizing the threat from the Soviet Union, Eisenhower and Dulles hoped to commit the American public and the NATO allies to an active foreign policy that would protect the West from communism.
Eisenhower and Dulles consistently alternated between publicly employing inflammatory rhetoric against Moscow and Washington's European allies while confidentially planning to pursue a policy of détente with Moscow and patience with the allies. Indeed, many internal documents reveal Eisenhower and Dulles deciding on a course of action during a morning meeting and then completely contradicting such action in an afternoon news conference. The reliance on rhetoric overwhelmed policymaking and made war more, not less, likely.
One example of this is their pursuit of"liberation" policy. During the 1952 Republican primary campaign and the 1952 Presidential election, Eisenhower and Dulles promised to liberate Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. The campaign also highlighted the conflict within the Republican Party over America's diplomatic responsibilities. Should America continue the internationalist diplomacy of the post-World War II years practiced by the Democratic Truman administration, the path favored by Eisenhower and Dulles? Eisenhower and Dulles envisioned an energetic America whose foreign policy would be primarily directed by the executive branch. Or should the nation revert to the"isolationist," pre-war position of Fortress America, the course favored by Eisenhower's rival for the Republican nomination, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio? Taft insisted that Congress be involved in the making of American diplomacy and preferred to limit American action overseas.
On the surface, liberation seemed to fit squarely into the internationalist position. As described by the Eisenhower Republicans, liberation marked a momentous change in policy for a party long noted for its ambivalence over foreign involvement. Conservatives such as Taft had opposed American entry into World War II, and they believed that America could stay strong only by renouncing foreign involvement. After the war, these"isolationists" also claimed that American sovereignty would be threatened by the demands of membership in a world organization such as the UN.
Eisenhower ultimately defeated Taft, and of course defeated the Democratic nominee, Adlai Stevenson, and became president. For the next four years, the Eisenhower administration consistently used belligerent rhetoric implying that it would support revolution in Eastern Europe. Eisenhower mentioned the plight of"the captive peoples" in every State of the Union address of his first term. Both he and Dulles vigorously supported Eastern European exile organizations that worked to undermine the communist governments behind the Iron Curtain. Press conferences and public addresses demanded that the Soviet Union free Eastern Europe or face the consequences. Finally, the administration allocated millions of budget dollars to the CIA, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America to beam broadcasts and other propaganda material to Eastern Europe.
The irony is that this reliance upon rhetoric as a tool of foreign policy prevented the successful prosecution of a pragmatic foreign policy. Eisenhower and Dulles, confidentially believed that a war could break out between the superpowers through miscalculation by one or perhaps both nations. In an age of nuclear weapons, the survival of the entire world was at stake. In this atmosphere, they realized, the vigorous prosecution of liberation could force the Soviet Union to react violently to any threats, real or imagined, posed by the United States in Eastern Europe.
Consequently, in their internal deliberations, the Eisenhower administration categorically rejected liberation policy. Unfortunately, Eisenhower and Dulles failed to relate this in their public rhetoric. Instead, they continued to mouth ambiguous and dangerous statements about America's responsibility to the captive peoples and promised"peaceful" liberation, all the while failing to explain how this would be accomplished. Liberation policy proved to be empty when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956 and the Eisenhower administration failed to help the Hungarians. Eisenhower and Dulles had conveyed to others within the administration that they planned on providing military aid to any Eastern Europeans who revolted against the Soviets: America's Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., for one, was shocked when nothing was done. The administration failed to understand the power of words in a climate of insecurity brought upon by the Cold War and the new technology of nuclear weapons.
At the present time, we are not privy to the internal deliberations of the current administration, so we can only analyze Bush's public rhetoric. But so far, President Bush seems to have sidestepped the potential pitfalls of pursuing rhetorical diplomacy. He has referred to the terrorists and Bin Laden as"evil" or"the evildoers," which seems quite appropriate to refer to individuals who killed 6000 innocent people. He has quite properly said"if you're not with us, you're against us," recognizing that the terrorists killed hundreds of citizens of other countries on September 11. He has also not tried to sugarcoat that the U. S. is in a war with the forces of organized terrorism, nor has he ruled out retaliation against nation-states that support terrorism.
Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the rest of the national security team seem to have learned from watching previous presidents make tough, bellicose speeches and yet not follow through on the promises made in those speeches. Surely they remember Ronald Reagan promising"swift and effective retribution" against terrorists during the 1980 campaign. Yet Reagan meekly pulled American troops out of Lebanon after terrorists blew up the Marine barracks and killed hundreds of American soldiers. They must have heard Bill Clinton's talk tough after terrorists bombed American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Yet Clinton merely lobbed a cruise missile or two into Sudan and Afghanistan in a half-hearted attempt to"get" Bin Laden. Bush should also read Michael Beschloss's new compilation of Lyndon Johnson's taped conversations from the Oval Office. He will discover that LBJ talked tough in public about a victory in Vietnam while he confidentially admitted that the U. S. could never win the war.
Bush also seems to understand that this war is unlike any the United States has ever fought. He has embraced the mantle of leadership, promised victory, and rallied the country around his administration. At the same time, he has refused to set a date for ending the bombing of Taliban forces and has repeatedly said that this war will not be easy to prosecute. Nor has he promised a quick victory. How many other presidents would say that this war may not be won in our lifetimes? Cheney has even gone so far as to declare that in this war the United States may very well suffer more civilian casualties at home than military casualties abroad. These are scary and upsetting thoughts, to be sure. Yet, in an age of 15-second soundbites and around-the-clock cable TV coverage, these comments are strikingly on-target, soberly delivered, and most importantly, realistic. Bush may very well have struck the proper balance between talking tough publicly and confidentially having the determination to see a policy through to the end. If so, he may have already learned from Eisenhower's example. He may have avoided the appearance or reality of a credibility gap that so bedeviled his predecessors in the Oval Office.