Iraq in April 2004

The situation is very complex and fluid. As we approach the June 30 deadline it may get more complex, more fluid and much more violent.

Some in the U.S. had completely unrealistic expectations given the facts on the ground in Iraq. These overly optimistic predictions have not been met. It makes one wonder whether they knew the facts on the ground, or whether they considered such harsh realities to be an important part of a decision-making process.

Part of the problem of the Iraqi reaction to the situation may be based on their prior expectations. It seems they were far too high. Many Iraqis may have expected too much, too soon, and now have dashed expectations. Dashed expectations often lead to anger and resentment. Add this growing resentment to the resentment over being invaded and occupied and you have a real problem on your hands.

Militarily this is far from over. It seems that there are more and more insurgents each day. It could be that the hard way to stop the insurgency is the wrong way. This may be particularly true of the Shia whose social psychology surrounds the importance of martyrdom, of Hussein and of their people. The more Shia killed by U.S. soldiers, the more insurgent Shia there will be.

To complicate things even further there is a power struggle going on within the Shia community. Ayatollah Al-Sistani, a marja'a and the highest-ranking religious authority in Iraq, is trying to keep a lid on things. Ayatollah Sitstani's following can be counted in the millions. Muqtada Al-Sadr, a 30-year-old mid-level cleric, is a major antagonist in this power struggle. He is also being accused of being involved in the murder of Ayatollah Al-Khoie last year.

He, or his surrogates, is directing attacks on coalition forces and others it seems. He is voraciously anti-CPA and anti-coalition, but he has a growing following. His following can be mostly found amongst the poor youth of the slums of Baghdad and other cities in Iraq. But he is also finding a following and support in other quarters, as he becomes more defiant and more popular. There are even indications that his Jaish Mahdi (Army of the Mahdi) are getting support from, and giving support to, Sunni Arab uprisings in the country.

There have been many violent acts against the coalition and the CPA in the ineptly named Sunni Triangle. (I say ineptly named because by naming it so it makes it seem like the U.S. is at war with the Sunnis. Whoever came up with that designation should be sent to public diplomacy school for the politically tin at ear.)

The Sunni, especially those from the groups connected with Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath, lost the most with the fall of the former leadership. They can also be significant losers if the Shia and Kurds (a combined 83+ percent of the population of Iraq) decide to team up and settle scores against them or work together on certain programs in Iraq - leaving the Sunni Arabs out.

So far this does not seem to be happening, but both the Kurds and the Shia had a very rough time of it under the Ba'ath and the Saddam Hussein Regime. The Sunni Arabs dominated the Ba'ath, and some of them were the main players in the Saddam Hussein regime. That is not to say that they were all part of it. That is far from the case. Many Sunni Arabs were also murdered, brutalized and robbed by the Saddam Hussein regime and the horrific Ba'ath party. Surely many Sunni Arabs are also happy they are gone.

The Kurds had developed a somewhat independent region in Iraq under UN sanctions and the no-fly restrictions. They are better off than the Sunni Arab and Shia. They have also had two separate independent governments operating in the north for the twelve years previous to the recent war. Kurdish children often do not speak Arabic. The schooling in the north has been very different from the schooling in the south for any years. The Kurds sometimes bring up the idea of moving toward complete independence, but it seems that the Turks would not be accepting of that idea. The CPA also seems very wary of that idea, given its interests in keeping the country together. The Kurds seem to be, in the main, the most welcoming of the three groups to the coalition and the CPA, but there are still tensions and misunderstandings that need to be worked out.

Is there a possibility for a civil war? Unless some formula can be worked out to settle scores and distribute power and wealth without huge social and political frictions then one cannot logically rule out some sort of civil war. But it is too early to tell whether this may happen or not. One can hope and pray that it will not. If it does, then we are all in a real mess. Everyone loses. But right now the possibility of that happening seems limited, because different groups seem to be combining in their dislike and resentment of the U.S., the CPA and the coalition forces. Also, each side may see that a civil war would clearly be a lose-lose situation for all.

One thing that has to be considered within all of this is that of the views of the common everyday people of Iraq. It is tough to figure that out. If a large majority supported the insurgents we would be seeing a lot more violence. But as time passes, and if their hopes continue to be dashed, then we could expect more of them to support the insurgents out of shear frustration and lack of hope that the CPA and the interim government will have much for them. My guess is that most of them are anxiously "fence sitting" to see where the chips fall. These are, in American terms, the silent majority of swing voters who could turn on the CPA and the interim government if they do not see any substantial progress, and certainly if things start to go further backward and the security situation gets much worse quickly.

The country is not fully under control. There are insurgent battles in many places in the country. Security in the country is bad and seems to be getting worse. It is absolutely paramount to get the security situation under control. But, again, the hard way may have much less effect, and could be even counterproductive, particularly compared to effectively administered soft-power methods.

The June 30 deadline is unrealistic and seems based more on domestic politics in the U.S. than on the realities on the ground in Iraq. We have presidential elections in November.

What are the chances for a real democracy in Iraq? Iraq has never had democracy. There has been no vote yet. Liberal democratic institutions have not been set up fully. There is no strong rule of law. There is no independent judiciary. There is no fully functioning, semi-independent bicameral congress or parliament. But it seems like there have been some small steps in those directions.

But the time has been so short. Many expected far too much to happen too quickly. The CPA runs the show. Iraq is under military occupation for now. It may be incrementally closer to democracy, but it is hard to tell in this fluid environment.

One thing that does give me hope that they are closer is a comment by Ayatollah Sistani when he said the government should be voted on, not appointed. The CPA and others are putting effort into developing institutions and documents that may help incremental (small) steps forward. But it is, and should be, up to the Iraqis how they will go forward with their chosen method of governance. I doubt that many want to go back to the old system.

If all goes well the Iraqis could have democracy - but on their terms. It could take decades. It could take many incremental steps forward and a few steps backward. Democratizing a country that has never had democracy, one that is just getting out of decades of brutal dictatorial rule, is presently occupied by foreign troops, and some of whose appointed leaders are long-term exiles with no political base in the country, will be extraordinarily difficult.

Iraq may just be the worst country to try this experiment of democracy in. There may be incremental steps forward, but historical, cultural, societal, and other inertial and dynamic changes could work against such incremental changes, if not drown them out altogether.

I would not be surprised if there were political assassinations and coup d'etats in the next few years. If the initial government developed out of this is not credible to the Iraqi people it will not last long - not after what they have endured over the past decades.

The situation is unstable, unsettled, and there are lots of scores to settle, as well as lots of power and wealth struggles that have yet to be worked out.

Economically, the country is a complete mess. Unemployment is very high. Poverty is very high. Investment, logically, given the insecure nature of the environment of the country, is very low outside the investments run and directed by the CPA.

The oil seems to be flowing again, and the electrical networks seem to be in a better state of repair. Some roads and bridges also seem to be fixed up and rebuilt. There has been some progress on large infrastructure programs. But blackouts and brownouts remain, and fuel for automobiles does not seem to be as plentiful as one would expect in an oil producing country. Iraq still has a very long way to go to get back to its pre-1980 level of economic development, or even its pre-1990 level.

But what counts for peace to prevail is for the Iraqi people to have jobs, decent jobs with good salaries so they can support their families. Just handing out subsidies now and then is not going to do this.

The CPA and the coalition forces have put some people to work for them, and are training and employing yet others. But, then, some of them are under threat by Iraqis who disapprove of cooperation with the coalition authority.

Presumably the CPA and the coalition forces are temporary phenomenon. One wonders what will happen to the people who work for them once they are gone.

Another aspect of the economy might be the impact of the huge inflows of money from the U.S. in particular. Iraq's economy is a small one, possibly $20-25 billion at most. An influx of, for example, $5 billion over a short period of time, could cause significant inflationary pressures. The money inflows and investment inflows need to be coordinated and directed toward labor-using technologies in order to absorb the huge excess labor (the unemployed and underemployed) in Iraq.

Another important issue is what to do with the oil money. In order to attract foreign investment some of the oil industry may need to be privatized. Wholesale privatization could be a big political mistake, even if it seems to be a good business decision by inspiring outside capital to come in to develop to develop, upgrade, repair, and improve wells, pipelines, ports, and transport facilities. It may also make good sense to get foreign capital in to explore the huge potential, and so far unexplored or under-explored, fields in Iraq. Only fifteen of seventy-five known fields in Iraq are fully explored.

If the Iraqi people get a sense that this is a selling out of Iraq there will be trouble. The oil industry is also not labor intensive.

The Kurds seems to be, as usual, doing better than the Sunni or the Shia. They have also been spared, although not entirely spared, of some of the burgeoning violence in the country. But I would not be surprised if such violence spread more, and become more common, into the Kurdish areas.

To be fair the economic and political environments of Iraq before the invasion were horrid. Infrastructure was in disrepair, unemployment was very high, health systems for all but the wealthy were dysfunctional and dangerous, and there was serious repression, oppression and state-run violence toward the Iraqi people. Many of the best and brightest engineers, managers, technologists, and others fled the country.

The Iraqi people had a very hard time from 1990 onwards under the brutal UN sanctions regime. The effects of the sanctions were further magnified, especially for the Shia, by the prejudicial use by the Saddam Hussein regime of the food, medicine and other goods obtained via the oil-for-food program. Food and medicine were not divided out on equal terms across ethnic or religious lines, and were sometimes used as weapons and as leverage during "elections." The Iraqi economy was on the downhill slide starting in 1980, when the Iran-Iraq war began. The cultural, moral and ethical norms of the country were also damaged from years of war, sanctions and brutal dictatorial rule. Crime was rampant. Corruption became a norm. Civil society was destroyed in its infancy. Suspicion and distrust ruled the day. People were selling their heirloom and even their front doors to buy food.

Those in the Saddam Hussein regime lived very high, as the regular people disintegrated economically, physically, socially, and educationally. The education system, which was one of the best in the region in the 1980s became a wreck. The CPA and others are trying to rebuild it, but this could take decades. The problem is not just in the buildings, but also in the culture of education. It will take a very long time to weed out the purchasing of degrees and the petty bribery that permeates every level of the education system. Many of the best professors and teachers fled the country.

The health system was also a wreck. Lights would go out during operations, or not work for days. Medicines were in short supply. The preferred bribe at the borders was often medicines. There was a large secondary market for medicines that were out of date. Many of the best doctors and nurses had fled the country. Anesthetics were often not available for surgeries, so these operations were postponed. Medical education was about twelve to twenty years out of date. Technology, when it worked, was often out of date or just plain dangerous.

The CPA and the coalition forces walked into a miserable mess of a country that was ruled by fear and violence for decades. It is not going to get the country back in order any time soon. And its time seems to be up in June 2004.

Part of the solution may be to somehow get many of Iraq's best and brightest who fled the country to come back and rebuild. Many have, but others have their lives developed elsewhere. Iraq needs expertise, and it would be best politically and culturally if that expertise came from other Iraqis mostly. It is tough to get people to go to such a risky and dangerous environment.

Has the Bush Administration succeeded at what they wanted to accomplish? The have regime change. They have captured Saddam Hussein and many other former leaders of Iraq. Otherwise, I am not sure what they have accomplished in any meaningful, long-term sense. I would rather not comment on the WMDs issue excepting that, so far, it has been a grave embarrassment to the U.S., and has led to a significant loss to its credibility worldwide.

The Iraq war has inflamed the region and has angered many in the Islamic world. The war also seems to be supplying recruiting arguments for extremists and jihadis. The Arab street counts more and more every day as the situation in the region gets more intolerable for them. Mass media, including the often state-run press, of these countries and the region have also put further fuel to the flames of Arab and Muslim anger.

I have never seen U.S.-Arab relations to be at this low a level. The combination of dashed expectations on Iraq, a strong dislike of U.S. policies toward Iraq over the decades, and a dreadful situation in the Israeli-Palestinian crises has severely damaged our relations with the Arabs. Some Arab leaders may be "playing ball" for their own reasons. But the Arab street is stewing in anger. This is very sad given that the Arabs and the Americans could be natural allies on many levels.

Importantly, 1.4 billion Muslims are watching this situation closely. There could be significant repercussions throughout the Islamic world if this whole situation goes south quickly and falls into uncontrolled chaos and violence.

The situation is far from over. This is a development still in progress. It is nearly impossible to judge what Iraq will be like in three months even, never mind three or ten years.

One would hope that it would improve greatly on many levels for the sake of the Iraqi people, the Arab world and the rest of us. Iraq is far too important to let fall further into chaos, mass poverty and ultra-violence.