Sistani, Sadr and the Shia: The Whole World Is Watching

The Shia have been brutalized, murdered, raped, and robbed by the leaders of Iraq for decades. They have never been able to have a significant say in the running of a country where they have been majority since the late 19 th century. They clearly think this is their time.

At the same time there has been an ongoing power struggle within the Shia community that may have led to the murders of Ayatollah Sayyed Abdul Majid Al Khoie, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim and others. Even the Marja’ Ayatollah Sistani has been threatened.

It seems, however, that Sistani still has enough clout to keep a lid on the situation. He seems to be the most powerful and respected person in the Shia community of Iraq. What he says has a great impact on many, if not most, Shia in Iraq and many Shia worldwide.

Hojetislam Muqtada Al-Sadr, a man in his early 30s who has not reached the level of scholarly or religious sophistication of Ayatollah Sistani, considers himself in the running to control the Shia community in Iraq.

He is less politically astute than Ayatollah Sistani, and does not have the massive following that Ayatollah Sistani has. However, he has the support of the poor, the underclass, and some of the many unemployed Shia in Baghdad, Basra, and other cities. These are the most frustrated and angry lot. His followers may be increasing given the large numbers that attended the Khutba he gave last week, and demonstrations in his favor in Basr recently. Some Shia seem to be turning to him because of the increasing insecurity in Iraq.

Muqtada al-Sadr bases his call to power on his ancestry and his family connections. He disparages the other Ayatollahs and claims he is a representative only of his father, not of the Hawza (the religious learning center in Najaf that holds great power now in Iraq) and not of anyone else.

His family has a long history of religious power. In this part of the world if you come from a highly respected family often that power and respect can be carried with you. His father and grandfather were revered Ayatollahs in the Shia community. His father also was a major figure in the Dawa Party, an energetic and increasingly powerful political element in Iraq. Saddam Hussein put great efforts towards the destruction of this group. It has had a resurgence since his fall.

Muqtada al-Sadr has a great chip on his shoulder given that Saddam Hussein killed his father, an Ayatollah with a large following, along with two of Muqtada’s brothers. He also seems to be resentful of the American’s unwillingness to help the Shia out during the 1992 uprisings. Al-Sadr has also shown in some of his public statements that he has a low opinion of western culture, and of liberal democracy.

Grand Ayatollah Kadhim Husseini al-Hairi , an Iraqi-born cleric who now resides in the city of Qom in Iran, made Muqtada al-Sadr his deputy in Iraq last April. Al-Sadr seems to have other ties Iran through the office of the Grand Ayatollah Khamenie. Rafsanjani, the former president of Iran, recently praised the anti-coalition activities of Muqtada al-Sadr.

Muqtada al-Sadr seems to be favorable to the idea of a Khomeini-like government based on the vilayet-e-faqi (vice regent or steward of God on earth, essentially and cleric-run state), like in Iran. Ayatollah Sistani seems to support some form of democracy, but it is not clear yet exactly what he wants. He may still be formulating that.

Muqtada al Sadr is clearly and vehemently against the CPA and the coalition troops. Some of his recent public statements have shown contempt for the Iraqi Governing Council, and the potential Interim Iraqi Government. He has the backing of his Jaish al-Mahdi, possibly 5000-6000 troops – and maybe growing rapidly. Al-Sadr preaches violent rebellion and has said publicly that he supports the violent behavior of Hamas and Hezbollah to the point that he has called his army the “striking arm” of Hezbollah and Hamas in Iraq.

He also runs a growing contingent of his supporters called the Jamaat al-Sadr al-Thani (The group of the second (or other) Sadr). The members of the Jaish al-Mahdi are likely also members of the Jamaat Al-Sadr Al-Thani.

The coalition seems to be determined to bring Muqtada Al-Sadr in to face charges that he had something to do with the murder of Ayatollah al-Khoie last year, and that he has been involved in some questionable financial dealings. He also seems to be behind many attacks on the coalition forces, the CPA, and others.

If we consider the “ Karbala Paradigm”, and how this might work into this situation, it could turn out to be a significant strategic error to go after Muqtada Al Sadr at this heated moment.

On the other hand, if there is proof that he was involved in the murder of Ayatollah Al Khoie, and the other things he has been accused of, that certainly complicates the heady tradeoffs between holding to the rule of law and making the proper strategic moves. If he is killed he becomes a martyr.

Martyrdom is a very big thing in the Shia community. It is a major part of the social psychology of the Shia going back to the time of the murders (martyrdoms) of Ali and Hussein. If he is killed Muqtada Al-Sadr’s ideas will gain a greater following, and there may be considerably more violence and fluidity in the situation than there might otherwise be.

However, if by arresting him and having him tried in a fair trial in a fair court of law, and the country gets a sense that a rule of law can work in Iraq, this could be a huge step forward toward a civil society and, possibly, the development of liberal institutions toward a liberal democracy in Iraq.

That is a tough trade-off. Also, this could be a real stretch of these concepts given the situation on the ground in Iraq, and what Iraqis have gone through in the last decades. A rule of law may seem to some Iraqis to be a distant dream given the past and present Iraqi environments. Any trial, even the fairest, might have little credibility in the emotionally and politically heated environment of Iraq – and of the region.

It may take decades for the idea and reality of a rule of law to take hold in Iraq. (It barely exists in the rest of the region.) Bottom line here: (1) arrest him and expect even more trouble; (2) kill him and expect even more trouble; and (3) don’t arrest him and lose credibility and expect even more trouble. Nothing is simple in Iraq.

A huge question here is whether the militias like the Jaish Al-Mahdi will combine or conflict with the militias being built up in the Sunni, Kurd, and Turkomen communities. There could be a slight whiff of Lebanon in the early 1970s in the air in Iraq. In Lebanon the country disintegrated into a civil war as militias from each community fought against each other for power, wealth, revenge, and in some case for reasons that were not exactly clear. Uncivil violence of the atavistic kind became almost an everyday event in Lebanon. There is a chance this could happen in Iraq. Huge efforts and some heavy thinking should be done to help ensure this does not happen. Nobody who has any sense and reason wants another situation like the nightmarish Lebanese Civil War.

Some members of Lebanese Hezbollah went to Iraq soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein. There are at least two groups in Iraq who call themselves Iraqi Hezbollah. It is hard to tell how these Iraqi Hezbollah groups will develop, if at all. It is also hard to tell what the Lebanese Hezbollah people have been up to in Iraq. It could be that they have been working at the behest of Iran. Iranian influence may be growing, but it is hard to tell where it stands at this time, and where that influence might be leading the country.

Iranians are in Najaf trying to negotiate a standoff between the American troops and Al-Sadr’s group and Jaish al-Mahdi. It could be that the Iranians could be a stabilizing influence in some respects as they act as mediators within the Shia community, and between the Americans and part of the Shia community. On the other hand Iran has interests in how Iraq develops. Iran also has its own problems between its moderates and conservatives.

How Iraq plays out could determine how Iran plays out. Both sides in Iran understand this, and are watching closely what is happening in Iraq. Many different parties in Iran would like to have some influence in Iraq.

Another wild card in all of this is the Shia militia called the Badr Brigade, the military wing of SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) that was run via Iran by the late Ayatollah Al-Hakim during the exile years during the Iran-Iran war and up to the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Ayatollah Al-Hakim was murdered last year in a car bomb. His brother, Ayatollah Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim now runs SCIRI and the Badr Brigades. He is also a member of the American appointed Iraqi Governing Council, yet is beholden to Iran in many ways.

One thing is clear, however, Ayatollah Al-Sistani is far more influential than the Iranians or Al-Sadr or just about any other Shia group in Iraq. Most of Iraq’s 15 million Shia follow him. He was born in Masshad, Iran, but that does not mean he agrees with the methods and government structure of the Iranians.

He has been very straightforward in his disagreement on the concept of clerical rule, and the vilayet-e-faqi as being the conceptual basis for an Islamic state in the present Iranian manner. He seems to believe in the ideas of his mentor, the much-revered Grand Ayatollah Imam Abul Qassim Al-Khoie, a known champion of the quietist paradigm for the Shia clergy.

Grand Ayatollah Al-Khoie considered, as the Shia have for all of their time up to Khomeini’s revolution in Iran, that the clergy should be separate from the state. He thought they should lead their people in ideas of religion, religious law and behavior, but should refrain from taking power and taking control of regions or states.

Ayatollah Al-Sistani's schooling and background are impeccable. He was chosen by the highest authorities of the Hawza of Najaf to take the place of the eminent Grand Ayatollah Al-Khoie. (Some of his Ayatollah Sitanis ideas and works can be found at www.sistani.org.)

Ayatollah Sistani controls tens of millions of dollars that are part of the Shia tithe, donations to through the Hawza, charities, and the mosques. Ayatollah Sistani runs schools, newspapers, magazines, charitable organizations, clinics and more. He doles out tens of millions each year to religious students, those who run and maintain Shia mosques, and others.

He and his advisors are considering setting up a satellite TV station. One would expect this station to be very different from Al-Jazeera or MTV, and to be a powerful voice not only in Iraq, but also throughout the region.

It has also been mentioned on more than one occasion that Ayatollah Sistani wants to move the educational and religious, as well as political, centers of gravity in the Shia world to Najaf and Karbala, and away from Qom in Iran.

The change in Iraq’s relations with Iran that may happen through Ayatollah Sistani and people like him may be that Iraq, especially Najaf and Karbala, may have more influence over Iran than Iran has over Iraq.

Ayatollah Sistani is revered and respected in Iran also, as well as in the Shia communities of India, Pakistan, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. In the eyes of many Shia he is a great and a good man, a source of emulation, a marja’. Ayatollah Sistani and others like him could be the catalysts for a Shia reawakening and resurgence that may counter the failed experiment of clerical rule in Iran.

Ayatollah Sistani is looking toward an Islamic democracy. If this works, and the Shia put efforts into making sure that human rights, religious freedom, and other liberties for non-Shia are protected, as well as allowing for the development of a liberal democracy on Iraqi terms then they will have succeeded where the Americans might fail. Surely the Hawza’s and Sistani’s views on liberal democracy will be different from those one might find on Capitol Hill or in London, but this is their country.

Ayatollah Sistani has shown sophistication and subtlety when dealing with the occupation troops and the CPA. He will not meet directly with Mr. Bremer or anyone from the CPA because he does not want to be tied too closely to the Americans. He needs to preserve all of his credibility in this situation.

He was often quoted as saying that when an Iraqi Shia meets with any of the CPA or coalition people that he should tell them: “Thank you for getting rid of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath, but when are you leaving?”

He unambiguously supported the ousting of Saddam Hussein, but he has made his opposition to the long-term continuation of the occupation of Iraq by the US and other coalition forces very clear. He sees this as the time for the Shia.

But Iraq contains more than just the Shia. For Iraq to be preserved as a country, and a country in peace, all of these groups need to work together for a better future for Iraq.

If the Shia can work together with the Sunni Arabs, the Kurds, who are mostly Sunni, the Christians and others in Iraq to develop a better Iraq then we have all won. It seems to me that the Ayatollah would want the best for his people.

The question remaining in my mind is how he defines his people. My sense is that it will include all Iraqis, including the smallest and weakest of minority groups. I hope this is the case. But he has to walk a very fine line on this issue.

If he is the great and good man that so many claim then he understands the importance of adel, ihsan, ijma, shura, and the Sufi motto: sulh-I-kul (peace for all).

Contrary to much that we read in the western media, and in the media of the extremists, Islam is an inclusive religion of moderation and reasonableness. Ayatollah Sistani and the Hawza of Iraq could be doing the world a great service if they bring these true ideas of true Islam to the forefront of the debates and discussions of where Islam and Muslims are going, who they are, and what they represent.

The situation is hard to predict and to understand fully just yet. But one should not let biases toward the Shia taint one’s abilities to decide what good might come of all of this. Surely the rights, freedoms and responsibilities of the other groups in Iraq need to be considered. It is important to understand that the Shia are the majority. They hold most of the cards. Ayatollah Sistani is the most powerful amongst them. There may be a real chance for a much better future for Iraq if the CPA works with them, and the others, for a better Iraq on Iraqi terms. It is, after all, their country.

But certainly things are not at all so rosy now. Violence is on the rise in the country. The security situation is heading south quickly. The economy is being damaged by the violence as some investors and contractors leave, and as important leverage industries like oil, electricity, transportation, and communication are targeted.

The Shia are now facing massive unemployment, a declining security situation, and a growing resentment of the US and coalition presence. Ayatollah Sistani may be able to keep the lid on for a while, but as frustrations, violence, fear, and poverty grow more Shia may turn to Muqtada Al-Sadr. Al-Sadr is not a source of emulation, a marja’, but he speaks to the people in words they can relate to, and he comes from a powerful family which surely has the connections to make things happen in the country.

Let us not forget in this discussion that there are two other Grand Ayatollahs Muhammad Ishaq Fayadh and Bashir Hussein al-Najafi. They almost never talk politics, but they have a very large followings. They are not at the level of Al-Sistani, but their words have strength in Iraq.

There are other religious scholars and other important Shia groups who seem to be either sitting on the fence waiting to see how the chips fall, or jockeying for power. But Ayatollah Sistani and Muqtada Al Sadr so far seem to be the main players in this most complex and dangerous situation.

Other groups to watch are the former followers of the Ayatollah Sayyed Abdul Majid Al-Khoie who was murdered last year. If they are convinced Muqtada Al-Sadr was behind it, or involved with it, they may seek revenge. Ayatollah Al-Khoie was the most pro-American of all of the Ayatollahs.

SCIRI, its Badr Brigades and the followers of late Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim could be a problem for the coalition as well. But they do not seem as yet to be at a boiling point, and possibly Iran can help to keep them out of trouble for now. They lived in Iran, and operated their missions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from Iran, for many years.

But sometimes things are not always as they seem at first look. Ayatollah Sistani has said a couple of things that seem to not be entirely condemnatory of Al-Sadr’s behavior. If the situation in Iraq gets worse then we might see Al-Sadr and Ayatollah Sistani getting a bit closer.

This could bring a coagulation of opposition elements, or marginal opposition elements. The longer the economic, political and security situations fester the more the opposition will grow, and the more likely that opposition groups that would not otherwise combine for ideological or other reason, would form joint ventures or partnerships in order to speed the exit of the coalition, or at least to give them a very hard time.

Ahmed Chalabi is also a Shia, but he does not seem to have much of a political base in Iraq, and had been outside of the country for decades. His somewhat shady background also keeps many Shia at a distance. Compared to the Ayatollah Sistani, Ahmed Chalabi is not even a junior partner in the firm. He is a new associate of questionable reliability and quality, according to many Shia. Also, It seems he has no future in the Iraqi Interim Government. He has also lost credibility with the Americans and others. His information about WMDs proved to be false, and his predictions about the Iraqis welcoming in the coalition troops proved mostly, and sadly, false.

There are also other Shia in the Iraqi Governing Council, many of whom are trying to negotiate a settlement amongst the contending parties to soothe things within the community.

One can hope and pray for the sake of Iraq that the Hawza, the Ayatollahs, political and intellectual leaders and others within the Shia community can quell the violence in order for them to help put Iraq back together again for the benefit of all Iraqis. By doing this they could pave the way for the Shia to finally have some of the political and economic power they have felt they were robbed of over the last decades. (Readers may want to read through the “Declaration of the Iraqi Shia” found at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/iraq/shia02a.htm to get a sense of what many of the Shia’s objective might be.)

The Shia are pivotal for the development of democracy in Iraq. They are pivotal in the determination of whether Iraq remains as one, or splits into more than one, state. They will be pivotal in the futures of the entire world community of Shia. In many ways they are pivotal for the perceptions of Islam in the non-Islamic world. The Shia of Iraq have found themselves in the middle of a confluence world historical events. The whole world is watching.

Note:  Bibliography available upon request.